Can Emerging Markets Tilt Global Product Design? Impacts of Chinese Colorism on Hollywood Castings by Hermosilla, Manuel et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Can Emerging Markets Tilt Global
Product Design? Impacts of Chinese
Colorism on Hollywood Castings
Manuel Hermosilla and Fernanda Gutierrez-Navratil and
Juan Prieto-Rodriguez
Johns Hopkins University, Universidad Publica de Navarra,
Universidad de Oviedo
30 September 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82040/
MPRA Paper No. 82040, posted 21 October 2017 10:32 UTC
Can Emerging Markets Tilt Global Product Design?
Impacts of Chinese Colorism on Hollywood Castings∗
MANUEL HERMOSILLA†
Johns Hopkins University
FERNANDA GUTIE´RREZ-NAVRATIL
Universidad Pu´blica de Navarra
JUAN PRIETO-RODRI´GUEZ
Universidad de Oviedo
October 2017
Abstract
In various cultural and behavioral respects, emerging market consumers diﬀer
significantly from their counterparts of developed markets. They may thus derive
consumption utility from diﬀerent aspects of product meaning and functionality.
Based on this premise, we investigate whether the economic rise of emerging markets
may have begun to impact the typical “one-size-fits-all” design of many international
product categories. Focusing on Hollywood films, and exploiting a recent relaxation
of China’s foreign film importation policy, we provide evidence suggesting that these
impacts may exist and be non-negligible. In particular, we show that the Chinese
society’s aesthetic preference for lighter skin can be linked to the more frequent
casting of pale-skinned stars in films targeting the Chinese market. Implications for
the design of international products are drawn.
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1 Introduction
Fast-paced, sustained GDP growth and increasing integration into world trade have made
emerging markets important new players in the global economy. These economies have
rapidly enlarged their middle classes and significantly reduced poverty (Sala-i Martin,
2006; Sudhir et al., 2015; Chandy and Narasimhan, 2015), endowing significant shares of
their populations with purchasing power and access to retail commerce. As a result, this
process has articulated an influx of “newly endowed” consumers into the global demand
for products and services.
In this article we investigate the importance of this phenomenon for the design of
international products. These “newly endowed” consumers are known to significantly
diﬀer from their counterparts of developed markets in cultural and behavioral respects
(Henrich et al., 2010; Sheth, 2011). For example, whereas the former emphasize embed-
dedness and hierarchy, the latter emphasize autonomy and egalitarianism (Burgess and
Steenkamp, 2006). Diﬀerences like this suggest that consumers from emerging markets
may place utility value on diﬀerent aspects of product meaning and functionality. Their
activation into the global demand for products and services may therefore bring along a
shift in aggregate consumer preferences within the total addressable market, prompting
so an impact on (or accommodation of) product design.
Although these design impacts may unfold through additional product variety, they
are likely to be more transparently observed on products which cannot be meaningfully
customized to each international market. That is, on products which, due to the nature
of their development process, are “condemned” to a largely standardized design. These
products are the focus of this study. For ease of reference, we call them “global prod-
ucts.” We associate them to categories such as feature films, TV series, music, video
games, literature and other commercial art forms, as well as alternative kinds of written
and audiovisual media (e.g., blogs, podcasts). We observe that, despite the fact that some
of these may undergo minor forms of international customization, large fixed re-design
costs prevent deep customization. For example, although feature films may be dubbed
and slightly edited when released in a foreign market, the more important determinants
of their appeal to audiences (aesthetics, storyline, central themes, starring actors) are
deeply enmeshed in, and inextricably tied to their core structures, and thus largely un-
customizable. We ask: can the newly acquired importance of emerging markets impact
their “one-size-fits-all” design?
To shed light on this question, we study the design of Hollywood films. Labeled as
“unique and complex artifacts” (Craig et al., 2005), feature films embody “explicit visions
of the world” (Moul, 2005), and are rich in cultural meaning (Craig et al., 2005). They
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thus entail a likely arena for a shift of aggregate cultural preferences to manifest on.1 Our
research design is also informed by the graduality of emerging markets’ rise to prominence
—a process that has unfolded over at least three decades. Because other relevant factors
have also been changing during this period, isolating the referenced preference shift over
such long time span would be diﬃcult. We therefore exploit the variation created by a
single event, which heightened the global relevance of consumer preferences from leading
emerging market. This is, the 2012 relaxation of China’s foreign film importation policy.
Since the Cultural Revolution, China has maintained stringent restrictions on foreign
film importation. These started to be challenged by the US Government when China
joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. During this period, however, there was
a large amount of uncertainty regarding whether, when, and how China would respond.
Fostered by the broader political circumstances, these restrictions were finally loosened
in February of 2012. From the perspective of Hollywood studios, this policy change
eﬀectively constituted a one-time, discontinuous, and large increase in the importance
of Chinese preferences within the total addressable market. Our empirical analysis aims
at deciphering whether, in adapting to the new market environment, Hollywood studios
accommodated core elements of film design to elements of the Chinese culture.
By 2012, Hollywood was already actively pursuing the booming Chinese theatrical
market.2 Anecdotal evidence suggests that this push may have impacted film design
through the inclusion of additional footage (including Chinese actors or Chinese product
placement, or scenes shot in China), and the implementation storylines exalting Chinese
people, values, or institutions.3 While noteworthy, these events were reportedly rare.
More importantly, they may not necessarily evidence accommodation to the culture of
Chinese people. The inclusion of Chinese-targeted additional footage (a mild form of
customization) may have been motivated by the very goal of avoiding to accommodate the
otherwise standard design. In turn, the implementation of storylines that exalt Chinese
themes may have been solely oriented at earning the goodwill of the regulating authority
(and with it, market entry). These themes would thus reflect accommodation to the
preferences of gatekeepers rather than to those of audiences. With these caveats in mind,
we examine a marker of cultural accommodation that is both deeply ingrained in a film’s
design, while at the same time not a suspected object of scrutiny by Chinese gatekeeping
authorities. That marker is the skin color of starring actors.
1Walls and McKenzie (2012) provide evidence that suggests that the Hollywood industry has started
increasingly cater to foreign preferences. However, the foreign markets that they consider do not include
emerging markets.
2After tripling total box oﬃce revenues in a 5-year period, China became in 2015 the second largest
market (after the US and ahead of the UK), accounting for 18% of the approximate $40B global box-
oﬃce revenues (Motion Picture Association of America, 2015). The market, which already tops the
international list in term of number of screens (Lin, 2016), is projected to displace the US in at the top
of the box-oﬃce ranking by the turn of the decade (Kokas, 2017).
3Rosen (2015) cites examples suggesting that Hollywood has begun to progressively avoid negative
representations thereof.
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Evidence from a variety of domains converges on the notion that people in China (and
other Asian societies) exhibit a strong form of coloristic preferences, by which pale skin is
aesthetically preferred to dark skin. These preferences were forged over 2,000 years ago
in the Chinese society. Today, they do not appear to be a purely implicit cultural trait,
nor a matter of public controversy. Our review further suggests that coloristic preferences
in China manifest more as a “light-skin premium” than a “dark-skin penalty,” and that
skin tone corresponds to central axis for perceived beauty, particularly for women. As
such, skin color plays a defining role in the burgeoning Chinese cosmetics market. To this
point, an oﬃcial of China’s cosmetics trade association stated that “skin whitening has
a long history in Asia (..) this obsession with whiteness has not faded over time” (Xi,
2011).4
In a sample of about 3,300 films, our empirical strategy exploits an important feature
of observed patterns of US film entry into the Chinese market. This is, films that enter
tend to have a rather specific profile, which did not materially change after the new
policy came into place. Based on this observation, and using a rich set of observable
film characteristics, we are able to rank films in terms to their exposure to the policy
shock. For example, because low-budget, 2D, horror or comedy films rarely enter China,
it can be presumed that their castings were less impacted by the policy change than that
of high-budget, 3D, action films, which enter the market much more often. We draw
inference from a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences specification, which implements a comparison
between films produced before and after the policy change, across the range of exposure to
the shock. The leading threat to the causal interpretation of our estimates is the possible
endogeneity of observable and unobservable film characteristics. We are able to address
this concern directly, finding no evidence to support it.
According to our preferred specification, the participation of pale-skinned star actors
among films in the top decile of shock exposure increased by about 8% as a result of
the policy change. We take this result as evidence of cultural accommodation, and refer
to it as the light-skin shift (LSS). The result is robust to a series of checks, and its
causal interpretation is supported by falsification tests and an analysis of the eﬀect’s
composition. In particular, consistent with the idea that Chinese coloristic preferences
impose more stringent beauty standards on women, and better resemble a “light-skin
premium” than a “dark-skin penalty,” we find that the LSS mainly operated through the
more frequent inclusion of pale-skin actresses, and that it was not associated with a sharp
decrease in the participation of actors of dark-most skin colors. Further analysis suggests
4It is important to highlight that coloristic preferences are not exclusive to the Chinese culture nor to
Asia in general. In fact, evidence that coloristic preferences shape socio-economic and cultural outcomes
is available from around the globe –including societies with predominantly dark-skinned populations.
Several such cases are described in Hall (2012). The World Health Organization (2011) further notes
that the consumption of potentially hazardous skin whitening cosmetics is prevalent around the world.)
Our focus on China stems from the conflux of factors that make of it an interesting subject of study,
namely, this nation’s economic prowess, the marked presence of coloristic preferences therein, and its
recent foreign film importation policy change.
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that the LSS was neither driven by a shift towards the (mostly light-skinned) Superstars,
nor the preferences of Chinese gatekeeping authorities.
Although emerging markets have received growing amounts of interest from marketing
scholars, the vast majority of this work has treated them as “testing grounds” for theories
coined in the context of developed markets, or focused on understanding the nature and
local implications of their institutional, cultural, and behavioral diﬀerences with developed
markets (Burgess and Steenkamp, 2013; Narasimhan et al., 2015; Sudhir et al., 2015;
Chandy and Narasimhan, 2015). We contribute to this agenda by highlighting that these
diﬀerences may also have first-order implications at a global scale. The culturally sensitive
nature of our dependent variable further reinforces this point, by suggesting that the
emerging markets’ newly acquired economic prowess may be propelling their preferences
to “swim against the current” in the global stage. Our work also contributes to the
literature on product design, where large-scale empirical studies are scant (Bloch, 1995;
Luchs and Swan, 2011).
Our results have an obvious implication for the design of international products and
services. Whereas analyzing the cultural and behavioral landscape of developed economies
may have been suﬃcient to inform design in earlier days, the irruption of emerging mar-
kets renders it likely insuﬃcient now. Moreover, in several ways, the irruption of emerging
markets has added preference heterogeneity to the global addressable market, possibly in-
creasing the diﬃculting of achieving satisfactory “one-size-fits-all” designs. This challenge
stands out in the context of feature films, where consumption value is assessed through the
lens of culture, and where wide cultural divides may force studios to reconcile somewhat
opposing views. Such diﬃculties resonate, for example, with the case of “The Great Wall”
(2016), whose lackluster commercial performance was rationalized on the basis that “the
film pulled itself in two directions to please the ‘other’ audience, which in the end pleased
neither side of the world” (Mendelson, 2017a).5 Although we here focus on coloristic pref-
erences, such cultural divides may also manifest with respect to other culturally sensitive
issues, such as women’s rights, the scope of personal liberties, and the respect for au-
thority. Storylines and themes that shy away from such polarizing topics, or which avoid
stinging representations thereof, may help studios to avoid these unwanted trade-oﬀs.
Although our results connect with the recent controversy about racism in Hollywood
(Kang et al., 2014) at a high level, such connection is tenuous at best. We thus ask the
reader to interpret this connection with extreme care. Colorism does not equate to racism,
and our data do not report actors’ races. Moreover, there may be significant variation in
skin tones within races, and colorism may manifest within individuals of the same race.
More importantly, racism in the US is usually perceived as a systematic prejudice or
discrimination against black individuals. Our results do not evidence this eﬀect. Instead
they show a favoritism eﬀect for individuals of light-most skin tones. This eﬀect seems to
5Mendelson (2017a) also references “Warcraft” (2016) as an example to the same point.
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have been sustained by the lower participation of actors of all darker skin tones. Although
these darker tones include African-American actors, they also include actors that appear
to have Latino, Indian, and Asian ethnicities, as well as many relatively darker-skinned
Caucasians (e.g., Adam Sandler, Al Pacino).
2 Coloristic Preferences
Coloristic preferences operate over the skin color of people, such that lighter skin is pre-
ferred to darker (Hunter, 2013).6 The manifestation of these preferences —Colorism—
does not equate to racism. Colorism is a matter of skin tone, which means that it can
manifest within or across races (Hunter, 2013). Furthermore, unlike racism, colorism is
not strongly linked to manifestations of violence or repression.
Colorism is also present in the Western World, including the US (Hunter, 2007). For
these societies, however, factors such as the more pervasive racial heterogeneity among the
population and in the media, and the vigorous aﬃrmative action against racial disparity
issues, suggest that overt coloristic manifestations may be met with social disapproval,
and that coloristic preferences may not shape beauty standards as strongly as in China.
According to Diko¨tter (1992), the Chinese society developed a white-black polarity
over 2,000 years ago, before the Qin dynasty. As in Europe before the industrial revolution,
light skin became a signaling device for class status, diﬀerentiating a leisure class elite
from lower-class groups. Mostly comprised by the agricultural peasantry, these tended to
have darker skin tone because of their more intense exposure to sunlight due to outdoor
labor.
Symbolized by the use of “white jade” as a metaphor for a light complexion (Diko¨tter,
1992),7 fair skin became idealized and associated with intellectual endeavor, beauty, el-
egance, and virtue (Sautman, 1994). This symbolism permeated into beauty standards,
as is reflected by one point in the “Ten Commandments of Classical Beauty of Ancient
China” —a woman’s beauty follows from “a skinny waist and snow-white skin”—, and
the proverb “One whiteness covers up one hundred ugliness.”
While the mechanics of skin color-diﬀerentiation were disrupted in Europe by the In-
dustrial Revolution, they remained largely intact in China, which continued to rely on
an agricultural economy until the economic reforms of 1978 gave way to industrialization
6Evidence has linked coloristic preferences with outcomes such as years schooling (Loury, 2009) and
overall educational attainment (Ryabov, 2016), assortment in the marriage market (Hamilton et al.,
2009), access to financing (Jenq et al., 2015), and lengths of prison sentences (Viglione et al., 2011; King
and Johnson, 2016). Kreisman and Rangel (2015) provide consistent evidence from the labor market by
examining earning gaps and tenure.
7In Chinese culture, jade symbolizes nobility, perfection and immortality, among other virtues, and it
is considered the most valuable of all precious stones.
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(Yao, 2000). In Europe, the Industrial Revolution caused the migration of outdoor to
indoor labor (Azoulay et al., 2009), and the massification of steam-based transportation
technology prompted elites to vacation in warm and sunny locations. Furthermore, rel-
ative to the Western world, China has maintained a high degree of ethnic and cultural
homogeneity, even throughout its recent process of economic development and global
integration (The Economist, 2016).8
Observers of the Chinese society rely on this history to explain how skin color, iden-
tity, and social status connect in today’s China. Referencing Hong Kong as a proxy for
Chinese society, Leong (2006) states that “skin color operates as a visual agent in defining
the boundaries of cultural identity, and in identifying a person’s place in a local social
hierarchy,” and suggests that white skin is the most important element of personal beauty,
as well as a marker for good health. Sautman (1994) reaﬃrms the role of pale skin as a
defining trait of beauty standards in today’s China: “fair skin continues to be a standard
of female beauty. Many urban Chinese women take pains to avoid the sun and some use
whitening creams.”
These marked coloristic preferences can be linked to a defining feature of the cosmetics
market in China and other Asian countries. For example, the China director of the
cosmetics multinational L’Oreal Paris has stated that “(Asian) women at every age want
to bleach their skin (..) Since fairness is the specific requirement of Asian women, these
kinds of products are only available in this area. But we do believe skin whitening will
retain its very important position here” (Xi, 2011). Correspondingly, Asia has been the
fastest-growing region in the global skin-lightening market since the 1970s (Tan, 2012),
exhibiting rates of growth in excess of 70% in recent years (Xi, 2011). Skin-whitening
products now account for about 30% of the over US$5 billion-a-year skin care Chinese
market, making it its largest category (Xi, 2011). By comparison, this share is less than
3% in the US (Statista, 2017). The strength of the phenomenon is also reflected by
intense competition and innovation in the category (Tan, 2012), as well as by graphic
advertisement campaigns which overtly associate departures of pale skin with ugliness
and awkwardness (Xi, 2011).
A common thread across these references is the idealization of white skin as opposed
to the denigration of black skin. This aspect may be rooted on the mechanics of so-
cial diﬀerentiation, as they apply to the Chinese context. In particular, because the
genetically-determined skin colors of Chinese people are generally light within the broad
spectrum of skin colors in humans (Wei et al., 2007), black skin is a virtually irrelevant
point of reference, and thus an ineﬀective anchor to base diﬀerentiation on. This suggests
that coloristic diﬀerentiation in China is likely to be driven by the degree of proximity to
8The Economist (2016) reports that “China today is extraordinarily homogeneous. It sustains that by
remaining almost entirely closed to new entrants except by birth.” This statement is in part supported by
recent statistics for naturalized citizens: while the US, Britain, France, and Russia naturalized between
0.1% and 0.4% of their respective populations, China has naturalized 0.0001% in total (i.e., across years).
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the “snow-white” ideal, rather than by the degree of separation from black skin extreme,
as most Chinese people would be roughly equally apart from it.9 The common practice
of avoiding sun exposure (Levin, 2012) supports this view, as it suggests that even minor
distortions to a pale skin tone can jeopardize this ideal. We conceptualize this idea by
saying that coloristic preferences in China manifest more like a “light skin premium” than
a “dark skin penalty.”
We conclude with two examples suggesting that Chinese colorism may influence con-
sumption decisions in areas beyond beauty products. In the early days of the modern
Chinese Photography market, Fuji outperformed Kodak. Smith (1996) suggested that
the cause was partly rooted on the former’s products’ skin-lightening eﬀect. Kodak later
replicated this feature. The popularity of recent “selfie-enhancing” cameras and apps
—known to produce the same eﬀect— atests to the same point.10 Chinese coloristic pref-
erences could also be linked to the recent controversy sparked by the poster of “Star Wars:
The Force Awakens” (2015). The controversy arose because, relative to the poster’s US
version, the Chinese version visibly minimized the character played by the black actor
Jon Boyega, while at the same time highlighted those played by the white actress Carrie
Fisher and Harrison Ford (Child, 2015).
3 Regulatory Framework
3.1 China’s Foreign Film Importation Policy
After a long ban established during the Cultural Revolution, the importation of foreign
films was reinstated in China in 1994, although with strict regulations. The purpose
of these regulations was two-fold. The first was to support the domestic film industry
by protecting it from international competition (O’Connor and Armstrong, 2015). The
second, to control the flow of information and content that may undermine the values
espoused by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or which portrayed the country or its
people in a negative light (O’Connor and Armstrong, 2015).11 To this day, all films that
enter China may be censored, or required to alter some of its content.
Since 1994, there have been two main modes for foreign films to enter the Chinese
market. These are, “revenue share” and “flat-fee entry.” Revenue sharing has been
9In contrast, coloristic diﬀerentiation in African societies is portrayed as operating through lighter
shades of black (Lewis et al., 2013).
10Forbes (Sin, 2016) reports that, due to its initial popularity, the price of the “selfie-enhancing” Exilim
TR Casio Camera rose from an initial US$249 to US$800-1000 shortly after its release. Quartz (2016)
reports that “selfie-enhancing” Meitu app had over 900 million users by March 2016.
11To this eﬀect, Lynch (2016) states that: “in China, films have long been an important propaganda
tool to promote socialist values and the hegemony of the CCP (..) Nothing says ‘Western Values’ quite
like a Hollywood movie.”
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the predominant choice for large-budget Hollywood blockbusters, as it allows studios to
participate in the box-oﬃce upside. In particular, studios retain about 13% of box-oﬃce
revenues (Cieply, 2012). Distribution is managed by a Chinese state-owned distributor
(O’Connor and Armstrong, 2015). Between 1994 and 2001, 10 films were allowed to enter
with this mode. When China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, this
quota increased to 20. On the other hand, under the flat-fee model, studios receive a fixed
upfront payment, but do not participate in box-oﬃce receipts. For this reason, flat-fee
entry has traditionally been preferred by independent films or smaller productions.12
Although diﬀerent State organisms may influence importation and censorship out-
comes, the primary gatekeeping authority is the State Administration of Press, Publica-
tion, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT). Because state-owned enterprises directly
benefit from the importation of popular films, importation and content control decisions
balance economic and ideological factors (Squire, 2004),13 suggesting that a film’s pop-
ularity among audiences may be a precondition for entry into the market. If satisfied,
censorship and editing may be used to veto/modify those films that conflict with the
gatekeeper’s ideological mandate. Alternatively, films with weaker popular appeal may
be favored if they align with it.
Content that exalts the Chinese culture, institutions, people, or values is expected to
earn the SAPPRFT’s goodwill.14 However, it is not always clear what kind of content will
achieve this goal or, in contrast, estrange the authority. For instance, when the animated
film “Despicable Me 2” (2013) was denied entry, many suggested the reason was an alleged
similarity between the animated characters (“minions”) and the former CCP’s Secretary
General Jiang Zemin, despite the authority’s oﬃcial position that the result was due to
low profitability expectations (Child, 2017). Qin (2011) and Grimm (2015) describe the
convoluted organizational structure that is responsible for importation and censorship
decisions (which includes a number of other organisms besides SAPPRFT), suggesting
that the resulting lack of transparency may be a deliberate feature, aimed at providing
authorities “with the maximum level of flexibility and eﬃcacy desired” in controlling
informational flows (Qin, 2011).
12An alternative route of entry entails side-stepping the “foreign film” label by engaging in coproduc-
tions with Chinese firms. Although there are no known restrictions for this entry mode, there neither is
a clear definition of what constitutes a legitimate coproduction in the eyes of the regulator, nor reassur-
ance that all coproduced films will be allowed in. In fact, in our data, about 45% of coproductions with
Chinese firms do not enter the market.
13An additional economic incentive for the importation of popular films stems from the reconfiguration
of Chinese retail commerce around shopping malls, whose operators have favored theater chains as tenants
in order to foster footfall (Financial Times, 2016).
14Perhaps the most salient example of studios’ strive to earn the SAPPRFT’s goodwill corresponds to
the “The Martian” (2015), where a mission of the Chinese National Space Administration saves the day
for the lead character and NASA (Hoad, 2015).
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3.2 2012 Policy Change
Although the revenue share quota was increased from 10 to 20 when China joined the
WTO in 2001, the stringent restrictions continued to stand in contradiction with a WTO’s
central mandate. Namely, they breached the equal right of all enterprises and individuals
—local and foreign— to import and distribute goods.
China was then called to altogether eliminate these restrictions. In open contradiction
with its plans, China ignored the request, prompting the US government to bring a case
against it at the WTO (Voon, 2009). Lacking response, the case proceeded. In 2009 a
WTO panel oﬃcially determined that China remained in violation of its obligations as a
member of the organization (Voon, 2009). The panel later rejected a Chinese appeal, and
a formal call to comply was issued in March of 2011 (O’Connor and Armstrong, 2015).
Despite this sustained pressure, China’s strong views on safeguarding its tight control
over informational flows and protecting the domestic industry introduced a large amount
of uncertainty regarding whether, when, and under what terms restrictions would be
relaxed.
The new policy was forged during a February 2012 visit of then president-in-waiting
Xi Jinping to the US. Optimism for progress in film trade policy was weak at the time
as, in an essay published earlier in 2012, then-president Hu Jintao had laid out hostile
views towards the cultural influence of the West, and its attempts to interfere with China’s
path (Wong, 2012). Furthermore, although Hollywood’s interests were not absent from the
agenda, the focus was placed on bigger-picture issues, such as Human Rights violations,
the Syrian crisis, the protection of intellectual rights, and “fair play” in technological
trade (Lander and Wong, 2012).
A policy reform was nevertheless agreed upon during the visit. It was struck before
dinner on the last day of the visit, after Chinese agencies had signed oﬀ to the conditions
earlier the same day (Waxman, 2012). The new policy was implemented later in 2012,
and conceived as a 5-year transitory framework until a more definitive set of rules were
worked out.
This deal —known as the Memorandum of Understanding or Xi-Biden agreement—
changed the conditions for the most sought-after entry mode by large Hollywood studios,
revenue-sharing. Importation restrictions were relaxed in two main ways (Cieply, 2012).
The first was an increase in the percentage of box oﬃce receipts retained by foreign
studios, which rose from 13% to 25%. The second was an increase of the importion quota,
which rose from 20 to 34. Although the policy reserved the 14 additional slots for 3D or
IMAX films, there were no stated limits on 2D films among the remaining slots. Thus,
to the extent that the supply of 3D/IMAX films would not meet Chinese demand, the
policy change also improved entry prospects for 2D films. Both these changes point to an
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increased relevance of Chinese audiences’ preferences from the perspective of Hollywood
studios.
Despite not receiving much coverage by the Chinese media, some interpreted the Mem-
orandum as skillful political maneuvering by the impending President Xi: relative to the
other issues at stake during the visit, the agreement constituted a relatively minor con-
cession (Page, 2012). Moreover, the larger number of US films entering China would
help to fill the rapidly-expanding number of screens in China, and enable the transfer of
technology to the domestic industry. For the White House, the agreement was perceived
as “well-timed victory,” at a time it verged on the “embarrassing collapse of legislation
aimed at protecting intellectual property” (Waxman, 2012). Finally, reflecting the reign-
ing uncertainty and importance of the Chinese market for Hollywood studios, MPAA’s
Chris Dodd and Ron Kirk called the new agreement a “big deal” (Waxman, 2012) and a
“breakthrough” (Abrams, 2012), respectively, while an analyst commented “the unthink-
able happened” (Landreth, 2012).
4 Data
The construction of our data set entailed two main parts: the retrieval of information for
a sample of films from the IMDb website, and the codification of the skin colors of star
actors included on each of these films. Details for each are provided in turn.
4.1 Films
We employed three criteria to select films. First, we focused on films released in the US
between 2009 and 2015, a time frame which provided us (at the time of data collection)
with the roughly widest symmetric window around the policy change. Given our focus
on the Hollywood industry, the second criterion was to select only those films for which
the US was listed among the origination countries. The large number of titles available
from IMDb includes many small productions with little impact, so we further narrowed
down the sample to the set of more impactful films. We implemented this refinement by
focusing on films with a large enough number of popularity votes in the IMDb website.15
The distribution across release years of the 3,378 films in the resulting sample is described
by the bars of Figure 1. The number of released films is roughly stable across years.
We coded several design characteristics. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
15The IMDb popularity voting system is designed to minimize the extent of manipulation, for example,
by limiting voting rights to registered users and allowing these to issue a single vote for each film. The
selected threshold was 500 votes. Parsing through titles with fewer votes revealed that many such films
are notoriously less impactful. Moreover, for these, important design characteristics in our analysis below
are often missing.
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From technical specifications and keywords we generated the indicator 3D/IMAX, which
identifies the about 5% of films in our sample with these formats. IMDb data generally
associates each film with more than one genre. Drama, Thriller and Comedy are the more
frequent ones.16 We also generated a set of sensitive content indicators (i.e., sex, nudity,
violence, drug use, and strong language) by mining the keywords on the parental guide.
About 68% of films include at least one such type of content.
Although these variables capture a good amount of variation regarding films’ appeal to
diﬀerent audiences, their overall appeal may also be determined by other design features
which are not be fully-controllable during production. One of these corresponds to the
ratings awarded by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), which classify
each film based on the suitability of their content to diﬀerent audiences. These may
add information by capturing higher-level design characteristics, which unfold through
the specific portrayal of each type of content.17 Another non fully-controllable variable
corresponds to awards. Previous research has shown that the number of awards that a film
is nominated to and wins may signal a film’s quality to consumers.18 We thus constructed
the variables AWRDNOM and AWRDWON, which respectively track these.19
We also encoded production budgets. By a rational expectations argument, large
budget films may be designed to have broad appeal, in a way that is not captured by
the above variables. This may occur, for example, through the inclusion of spectacular
special eﬀects or popular (high-earning) actors.20 In turn, Chinese authorities attempting
to make eﬃcient use of the small number of revenue-share slots may favor films that
are both likely to appeal to a larger share of the population, and yield higher box-oﬃce
receipts. Because budget information for about 45% of the films in the sample is missing
from IMDb, we devised a coding scheme which primarily relies on identifying films at
the top of the distribution. In particular, assuming that budget figures are more likely
to be missing for films in which these are relatively small, we created the indicators
P75BUDGET and P90BUDGET, which respectively activate for films whose budgets lie
within the top 25% and 10% of the distribution of budgets for films released each year.21
16The “other” category includes genres that are less frequent in the data. These are: Western, Musical,
Biography, History and Sport.
17The system awards the following ratings: PG for films suitable for audiences aged 7 and older; PG-13
for audiences aged 13 and older; and R for restricted audiences. It has been argued that these ratings
can, by themselves, impact overall appeal and commercial performance of a film, even after holding
content constant (Palsson et al., 2013). The system has been criticized based on an alleged inconsistency,
whereby films containing scenes of comparable nature are awarded diﬀerent ratings (Pomerantz, 2010).
Consequently, they may be subject to a degree of uncertainty from the perspective of producers.
18Although proxying for a film’s quality through awards is problematic in some respects, previous
research has made this connection and provided supporting evidence (e.g. Nelson et al., 2001; Ginsburgh,
2003; Deuchert et al., 2005).
19We consider the following major awards: Oscars (Academy Awards), Golden Globes, BAFTA Awards,
Golden Lion (Venice Film Festival), Palme d’Or (Cannes International Film Festival), Grand Jury Prize
(Sundance Film Festival), The Golden Bear (Berlin International Film Festival), The Golden Leopard
(Locarno International Film Festival), and Filmfare Awards.
20In addition, promotional budgets tend to be proportional to production budgets (Vogel, 2014).
21In practice, this codification assumes that missing budgets lie somewhere in the bottom 75% of each
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The indicator BIG6STUDIO was created to identify films involving at least one of the
large “Big 6” studios.22 About 37% of the films in the sample fall in this category. This
variable may help us, among others, to control for potential diﬀerences stemming from
studios’ experience engaging with Chinese authorities. Further, we generated USONLY-
FILM to identify films produced by US studios only. Because these films are produced in
absence of international collaboration, they may have a relatively stronger emphasis on
US culture or values.
The variable CHINESECOPROD identifies coproductions with companies from China,
which could facilitate entry into that market.23 Furthermore, in order to pick up the po-
tential appeal derived the inclusion of local actors, we retrieved each star actor’s country
of birth. Because only few of the stars in our data set are reported as born in Mainland
China, we also considered actors born in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The indicator CHI-
NESESTAR identifies the small percentage (less than 1%) of films including at least one
such actor.
Entry into the Chinese market is codified by the variable CHINAENTRY. An initial
inspection of the data revealed that many of the films that IMDb reports as having been
shown on Chinese screens do not correspond to standard commercial releases, but to
limited releases (for example, in the context of screenings and festivals).24 Because such
releases may be subject to less stringent regulatory oversight, or mainly serve promotional
goals, they are not accounted for by CHINAENTRY.
Patterns of entry into the Chinese market according to CHINAENTRY are depicted
by the line plots of Figure 1. Whereas for bars (total releases of all US films in our sample)
the horizontal access represents films’ release year in the US, for line plots it represents
the year of release in China. Thus, the relatively smaller numbers for 2009 likely stem
from data censoring (as opposed to variations in the regulatory environment).25
By focusing on the type of films that are more likely to enter through the revenue-
share system (i.e., large budget-films), the red line maps out the impacts of the new policy
distribution. To investigate the validity of this assumption we resorted to IMDb popularity votes. In
particular, if we found that budget information tends to be missing for very popular films, our assumption
would not be supported by the data. Statistics presented in the Appendix suggest the opposite: films
with missing budget information are typically associated with a much smaller number of IMDb popularity
votes than those for which budget data is available.
22These studios are Disney, Fox, Paramount, Sony, Universal, and Warner Bros.
23As defined, CHINESECOPROD accounts for coproductions with Chinese companies or the inclusion
of scenes shot in Chinese territory. This variable is constructed primarily based on shooting location and
country of origin data for involved firms (available from IMDb Pro), but supplemented with films’ stated
country of origin. That is, CHINESECOPROD=1 if a one of the films’ declared origination country is
China.
24We identify these in the data through the following markers: festival release, limited release, screening,
premiers, and internet release.
25That is, some of the films that entered China in 2009 may correspond to films released in the US in
earlier years. This censoring will not aﬀect our later econometric results, as estimated models include
year fixed eﬀects and primarily rely on cross-sectional film design variation.
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changes on entry quite closely. The observed number of this type of films that enters China
is about 25 in 2010 and 2011, and a bit larger in 2012 (the new policy took eﬀect during
the summer that year). The pattern exhibits a discontinuous increase in 2013, when a
new level of about 35 is reached and maintained through the end of the sample period.
The diﬀerences between the observed pre- and post-policy change numbers with respect
to the stated quotas of 20 and 34 may stem from co-production arrangements, or flat-fee
entry that we are not able to identify from the data at hand. However, these diﬀerences
are small.
Also note that, despite that the new policy opens 14 new slots for 3D/IMAX films,
the more immediate entry impact is registered among films without these formats. This
supports our previous assertion that, despite its formulation, the new policy eﬀectively
expanded the market for both types of films during the covered period, 3D/IMAX and
not. Lastly, we note that the diﬀerence between the total number of films (black line)
and large-budget films that enter China (red line) is likely to reflect the extent flat-fee
entry, that is associated to smaller budget productions. This diﬀerence suggests that
only a very small fraction of small budget films (about 1% in our sample) will enter the
market. Thus, for the latter, preferences of Chinese audiences are likely to be a much less
important consideration for casting.
Finally, accounting for production lags will be important in our analysis. Film pro-
duction requires a set of activities (casting, shooting, post-production, etc.) which may
take several months, or even years. This means that the impact of 2012 policy change
may have started to manifest among cohorts of films released in later years. To determine
the specific cohorts that were impacted by the new policy, we retrieved production dates.
In particular, we considered the date at which filming started, which was available for
about 70% of the films in the sample. Using these dates to proxy for the time in which
casting decisions were likely already defined, we computed the production lags. These
correspond to the number of months between the reported date in which filming begun,
and the earliest release date in theaters. The distribution of these lags is presented in the
Appendix. The median of this distribution is 17 months, which suggests that the new
policy’s casting impacts must have been first perceived among the cohort of films released
in 2014.
4.2 Skin Color Coding
We retrieved the list of actors starring on each film, and codified their skin color. We used
the list of star actors presented on each film’s main IMDb profile. Beyond their on-screen
relevance —that is, their importance as it relates to the number and types of scenes
they participate on— star actors usually have an important role in films’ promotional
activities, thus representing the most culturally-charged set of actors within the cast. A
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manual inspection of a number of films revealed that IMDd’s listed stars often correspond
to those appearing in promotional posters, and that these lists tend to coincide with those
of diﬀerent internet sources (Rotten Tomatoes, Wikipedia).26
Discarding actors for whom there was no profile picture available from IMDb, this
procedure resulted in a sample of 10,127 starring roles (i.e., actor/film combinations) and
5,442 actors. About 85% of films in the sample have three stars, while little under 2%
have only one. About 65% of actors play only one role in the sample, while 15% play two.
A relatively small fraction of actors (less than 5%) play more than 5.
We codified the skin color of each these using MTurk.27 A profile picture of each
actor was shown to 5 MTurk coders, asking each to rate the skin color in a scale with the
following entries: “very light,” “light,” “medium,” “dark,” and “very dark.” We did not
provide information about the actor’s filmography, nor anchored answers by providing
examples. We then codified each response in a 1-5 scale, where 1 corresponded to “very
light” and 5 to “very dark,” and averaged the scores awarded by coders within each actor.
Figure 2 presents the resulting distribution. The median of this distribution is 2, which
can be interpreted as 50% of actors in having a skin color that is somewhere in between
“very light” and “light.”
To contextualize these results and assert their validity, we selected a random sample
of actors across the range of skin color codes. Figure 3 presents the result. The most
important feature of this figure is that it suggests that the MTurk coding results in a
reasonably accurate ordering of actors based on their skin color: from left to right, skin
colors progressively darken. The figure also suggests that the coding procedure was robust
to less-than-ideal profile pictures. Pictures distorted by background light, or with actors
wearing hats or hoods, do not evidence blatant coding errors.
To further assess the validity of this procedure we investigated the degree of agree-
ment among coders. We focused on within-actor coding discrepancies, computed as the
diﬀerence between each coder’s rating and the average across coders. Results point to low
overall disagreement. The distribution is symmetric, over 75% of coder/actor ratings are
within the [-0.6,0.6] interval, and 90%, within [-0.8,0.8]. Furthermore, according to the
criteria of Cicchetti (1994), the resulting value of 0.9 for the average absolute-agreement
intraclass correlation is “excellent.”
To facilitate the description of casting patterns across films, we translated the skin
color alternatives presented to coders into a categorical variable. Denoting by ca the
average color score awarded to an actor a across coders, we assign the actor to a category
26In the Appendix we present a sample film to illustrate the retrieval of starring casts, and the corre-
spondence of this list with the design of promotional material.
27MTurk (Amazon Mechanical Turk) is a crowdsourcing online marketplace, where task requesters
post simple Human Intelligence Tasks performed remotely by workers. To minimize cultural variation,
we selected US-based coders only.
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k = 1, .., 4 if k < ca ≤ k + 1, with k = 1 for ca = 1. We then constructed nki as the total
number of actors that belong to category k and star in film i, and Ni as
∑
k nki. Thus,
given the results of Figure 2, n1i not only represents the number of actors in film i whose
skin is judged as “light” or lighter, but also the number of actors who have lighter-than-
median skin. These variables are summarized in Table 1. Because most films have three
color-coded stars, the 1.85 average of n1i suggests that two thirds of actors fall in this
category. The smaller average participation of dark-skinned actors (k = 3, 4) relative to
their frequency in the distribution of Figure 2 stems from the smaller average number of
roles played by them.
5 Empirical Strategy and Shock Exposure
5.1 Empirical Strategy
We conceptualize studios’ production decisions through product design pairs (Y,X), where
Y corresponds to observed casting decisions, and X to the remaining film’s design ob-
servables (e.g., genre, content, etc.). Within the latter we also include observable “behind
the scenes” production arrangements (e.g., co-productions, budget, etc.). Consistent with
our empirical analysis, we restrict our definition of Y to only encompass stars’ skin colors,
assuming their independence with respect to other of characteristics of relevance (e.g.,
acting skills, experience).
The theoretical object on interest is the optimal casting policy, Y ∗|X. We understand
this as the criteria that guide optimal actor selection given a film’s characteristics X. For
example, films inspired on World Wars may call for light-skinned actors, as these events
took place before major waves of African and Middle Eastern immigration into Europe.
For these films, the strive for historical accuracy may lead to an “organic” or “natural”
gravitation towards light-skinned stars.
To rationalize these policies, we denote by P(Y ) the distribution of preferences for
light-skinned stars in the total addressable (global) market. Once the policy change
became eﬀective, Chinese coloristic preferences acquired greater relevance within this
market, inducing a shift in this distribution. We denote this shift by ∆P(Y ). Our
inference is based on a comparison of optimal casting policies E[Y ∗|X] between films
whose characteristics X suggest a relatively large shift ∆P(Y ), and others for which the
shift was presumably smaller. Our focus on X-conditional casting policies means that we
aim to identify a potential change in the set or criteria that govern the selection of stars.
We next present a framework that allows us to implement this strategy in a simple
and transparent way. In this framework, ∆P(Y ) is operationalized through a “treatment
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intensity” function EXPOSURE(X) ∈ [0, 1]. This function is computed based on patterns
of China entry observed prior to the policy change. We use three variants of EXPOSURE,
one dichotomic and two continuous. The consistency of results obtained from each of these
illustrates the robustness of our main finding.
Under certain assumptions, a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences specification allows us to iden-
tify the causal impact of the policy change on optimal casting policies. At a broad level,
the eﬀect is identified by the progression of “pre/post” diﬀerences in E[Y ∗|X] along the
support of EXPOSURE. Specification details and assumptions are addressed in Section
6. We investigate the validity of the required assumptions, devoting special attention to
the potential endogeneity problem rooted on studios’ ability to choose films’ observable
and non-observable design characteristics.
The next subsection develops the basic elements needed to construct EXPOSURE.
We employ Probit specifications, which relate observables characteristicsX to CHINAEN-
TRY. As expected from our review of Section 3, results are consistent with the idea that a
variety of factors —related to both the preferences of Chinese audiences and gatekeepers—
influence the likelihood of China entry. We emphasize that disentangling the influence of
audiences’ preferences relative to those of gatekeepers’ is neither an essential question, nor
the focus of our analysis. A diﬀerent question —whether authorities impose a coloristic
bias on entry outcomes— is, however, relevant to interpret our results. We address this
question in subsection 6.6.
5.2 Determinants of Entry into the Chinese Market
The arbitrariness and non-transparency China’s importation and content control out-
comes suggest that entry into this market can never be assured. Thus, these factors
support a probabilistic framework to model films’ shock exposure.
We estimate Probit specifications using CHINAENTRY as dependent variable, using
the comprehensive list of observable film characteristics X of Table 1 as independent vari-
ables.28 Table 2 presents the obtained results. Columns 1 and 2 correspond to estimates
from the sample of films released in 2009-2012; Columns 3 and 4, those from the full sam-
ple. Odd-numbered columns do not account for design characteristics that are not fully
controllable during production (MPAA ratings and awards). We focus our discussion on
the estimates of Column 1, which will later be used to derive our main results.
We first turn our attention to genre indicators. These suggest that films in genres
such as action, adventure, thrillers, and romance command relatively higher China entry
probabilities. These results coincide with anecdotal evidence, some suggesting that action
28Standard checks (variance inflation, condition number) do not point to multicollinearity issues.
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movies with special eﬀects have particular appeal among Chinese audiences (Rankin and
Kaiman, 2014) and other that movie going has established itself as part of the ritual of
romantic courtship in the emerging Chinese middle class (The Economist, 2013).
On the other hand, comedy films exhibit systematically lower entry probabilities. This
result likely stems from a large cultural discount, rooted on the fact that humor does not
translate well.29 Interestingly, horror films also exhibit lower entry probabilities. As op-
posed to the previous eﬀects, this may more directly speak to the ideological mandate
of gatekeepers, as authorities are reluctant endorse the promotion of superstition and,
in particular, serial-killer type of violence (Martinsen, 2010).30 Thus, these results illus-
trate that the preferences of both audiences and gatekeepers may determine China entry
outcomes.
The coeﬃcients of P75BUDGET and P90BUDGET suggest that large-budget films
are more likely to enter China. This is hardly surprising as, for obvious economic argu-
ments, large budget films must be designed to have broad appeal. The lack of statistical
significance for the coeﬃcient of BIG6STUDIO may stem from its high correlation with
the budget indicators. The strongly significant and positive coeﬃcient of 3D/IMAX coin-
cides with reports suggesting the special adeptness of these formats to the Chinese market
(Sagakian, 2016).
As expected, the coeﬃcient estimate for CHINESECOPROD is positive, large, and
strongly significant across specifications. However, it is interesting that this variable does
not perfectly predict entry. This finding further supports the idea that entry cannot be
assured.
The positive coeﬃcient of CHINESESTAR and negative coeﬃcient of USONLYFILM
could reflect both audiences’ and gatekeepers’ preferences. In particular, while films with
Chinese stars may be more popular among audiences, gatekeepers may also see it fit to
further support their films. On the other hand, US-only films may have a more marked
focus on US values or themes. For this reason, they may not resonate with Chinese
audiences, nor with the mandate of gatekeepers.
As in most innovation contexts, the characteristics of the finalized product is not
be fully controllable during production. Nevertheless, these will usually still determine
the product’s appeal. Non fully-controllable design characteristics are included in the
specifications of even-numbered columns. The first of these corresponds to film ratings
awarded by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). We previously described
how these ratings can be important for a film’s commercial success, and they cannot be
29Speaking to this point, an expert on the Chinese film market states that “Humor is notorious for not
translating as well, say, action or thrillers. Some genres cross boundaries with relative ease, but humor
is much more diﬃcult” (Andress, 2016).
30“Films are forbidden to have the following contents: (...) publicizing obscenity or superstitions or
playing up violence” (People’s Republic of China, 1996, chapter I, article 5).
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perfectly anticipated during production. Even after controlling for the presence of diﬀerent
types sensitive content, results show that films with the more family oriented PG-13 are
more likely to enter China (relative to films in the omitted R/non-rated category). The
number and type of awards a film receives and is nominated to, is also a potentially
important non fully-controllable design characteristic.31 Results of Columns 2 and 4
support this view by suggesting that the number of major awards received can significantly
increase the probability of entering China.
Although estimates across columns suggest that the determinants of film entry into
China are relatively stable throughout the covered period, the value and statistical of some
coeﬃcients change. To investigate whether these imply a meaningful aggregate eﬀect, we
compare predicted entry probabilities across a wide set of specifications and estimation
samples.
Table 3 lists the considered samples, specifications, and correlations among predicted
entry probabilities. The correlations between probabilities predicted with estimates from
the 2009-2012 and 2013-2015 samples (bolded) are of particular interest. Their high
values suggest that the policy change did not materially alter the determinants of China
entry. That is, after the new policy became eﬀective, the types of design characteristics
that made a film more likely to enter China did not change much.32 This result suggest
that basing the construction of EXPOSURE on one or other set of estimates will not
significantly impact our results.
5.3 Shock Exposure
We formulate the following EXPOSURE metrics:
DEXPOSUREi = 1[Pˆr(CHINAENTRY|Xi) ≥ p(90)]
CEXPOSURE1i = Pˆr(CHINAENTRY|Xi)
CEXPOSURE2i = Normalized
(
1− log (1− Pˆr(CHINAENTRY|Xi)))
DEXPOSURE is an indicator variable, which is activated for films whose estimated entry
probability is equal or larger than the 90th percentile of the 2009-2012 distribution. CEX-
POSURE1 corresponds to the predicted probability of entry, whereas CEXPOSURE2,
to a convex transformation of it. The latter is included to account for the idea that
31These may increase overall interest among audiences amongst others, by generating word of mouth,
or signaling quality (Ginsburgh, 2003).
32Furthermore, note correlations between specifications estimated on the same subsample are also
generally high. This suggests that non fully-controllable characteristics does not materially condition the
likelihood of entry.
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the policy change may have had a larger impact at higher ranges of the predicted entry
probability.33 Its normalization re-scales the expression inside the larger parentheses to
the unit interval. We found no significant correlation between these metrics and films’
production lags.
For our main analysis, we construct these metrics using the results of Table 2, Column
1. Although we have shown that the determinants China entry did not meaningfully
change following the policy change, these estimates are preferred because they better
reflect studios’ information set as they crafted Y ∗|X policies in the wake of the policy
change. We include extensive robustness checks showing that our main result does not
hinge on this specification choice. Figure 4 presents the histogram of predicted probabil-
ities and describes each measure graphically. This figure suggests that, for the bulk of
films in the sample, the policy change may have had little impact.
6 Results
6.1 Light-Skin Shift
Here we present our main result, a shift towards the more frequent inclusion of light-
skinned star actors, among films with higher exposure to the policy shock. As announced
in the introduction, we call this result the “light-skin shift” (LSS). To do so, we opera-
tionalize Y ∗ through the dependent variable SHARELIGHT. We construct this variable
with the aim of reflecting the likely manifestation of coloristic preferences, namely, a
“light-skin premium” as opposed to “dark-skin penalty.” Results of subsection 6.5 sup-
port this specification.
We define SHARELIGHT as the total number of star actors in the lightest-skin cat-
egory (n1i) over the total number of skin-color coded star actors in a film i (Ni). That
is,
SHARELIGHTi =
n1i
Ni
To illustrate how SHARELIGHT traces a “light-skin premium” consider an alternative
metric, AVGCOLOR=(1/Ni)
∑
k k ·nki. Consider also two hypothetic films i′ and i′′ such
that Ni′ = Ni′′ = 2, n1i′ = n4i′ = 1, and n2i′′ = n3i′′ = 1. Under AVGCOLOR, both
films would rank equally under coloristic preferences, whereas under SHARELIGHT, film
i′ ranks higher than film i′′ because it includes one actor in the lightest-skin category.
33Our reasoning is based on the possible presence of risk aversion on the part of producers. Because
entry into China cannot be guaranteed, casting decisions Y ∗|X are made in the context of market
uncertainty. Because the costs implied by this type of risk are relatively more important, the lower
Pˆr(CHINAENTRY|X) is, the latter’s impact on casting decisions should be disproportionally larger at
larger values.
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Also note that, since the threshold dividing skin-color categories k = 1 and k = 2 also
corresponds to the median of stars’ skin color distribution, SHARELIGHT also represents
the share of “lighter-than-median” stars.
Table 4 presents descriptive evidence supporting the LSS. This table compares aver-
age values of SHARELIGHT across four groups of films. Films produced prior to the
enactment of the new policy averaged SHARELIGHT values of 0.65, irrespective of shock
exposure. That is, in the “pre” period, two out of the three stars included in the average
film belonged to the lightest skin-color category. Whereas in the “post” period this av-
erage remained virtually unchanged for films with lower shock exposure, it increased by
about 0.07 for films with higher exposure to the shock.
Figure 5 unpacks these averages temporally. In the “pre” period, trends are similar
across exposure groups. In the “post” period, this trend remains roughly stable for low-
exposure films but exhibits a discontinuous increase for high-exposure ones. Figure 6
presents an alternative view, by focusing on the share of films which only include light-
skinned (k = 1) stars. The same discontinuity is observed. To further characterize the
eﬀect, we estimate the following diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DiD) specification:
SHARELIGHTi = α + βEXPOSUREi × POSTt(i) +ΘXi + λt(i) + ϵi, (1)
where EXPOSURE corresponds to either of the measures introduced earlier. When im-
plemented as DEXPOSURE, the speficication represents a standard 2× 2 design. When
implemented as CEXPOSURE1 or CEXPOSURE2, EXPOSURE represents a measure of
continuous “treatment intensity.”34
Given the distribution of production lags, POST=1[t ≥ 2014] identifies the cohorts of
films that were likely produced after the policy change was announced. The term ϵ is an
independent error, and λ a release-year fixed eﬀect. The stand-alone POST is omitted
because λ makes it redundant. X is the set of observables used in the China entry probit
model. We do not include the stand-alone EXPOSURE variable because its variation is
picked up by X. Standard checks do not unveil multicollinearity problems. Throughout
our analysis, we report and draw inference from robust standard errors.
The parameter of interest is β. An estimate βˆ ̸= 0 would suggest that, after the
new policy came into place, films with more “China-oriented” characteristics X, altered
star casting guidelines. An estimate βˆ > 0 would be consistent with the descriptive
evidence by implying that such alteration favored light-skinned actors. Studios’ ability to
choose X introduces a natural concern about this inference. We address this concern in
subsection 6.3, finding no evidence to support it.
34This strategy —pairing a DiD specification with a continuous “treatment intensity” measure com-
puted on “pre” data— has previously been used to analyze natural experiments by Acemoglu et al.
(2004), Finkelstein (2007), Lakdawalla et al. (2013), Dranove et al. (2017), among others.
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This DiD specification is useful because it controls for two important forms of con-
founds. We previously illustrated one of these by citing films inspired on World Wars I
and II, which develop stories that are better suited for “light-skinned” characters. If this
was pervasive in the sample, we may observe baseline diﬀerences in the propensity to cast
light-skinned stars among films with diﬀerent characteristics. This eﬀect is controlled
for by including X as explanatory variables. In addition, there may exist unobserved
temporal variation, possibly arising from shifting conditions in the actors’ job market, or
from changes in disposable income across consumer segments.35 This form of unobserved
variation is accounted for by the release-year fixed eﬀects. Results below suggest that
these temporal trends do not diﬀer based on shock exposure.
Table 5 presents the estimated β coeﬃcients. These point to a robust, positive impact
of the policy change on average SHARELIGHT values. The direct correlate of Figure 5 —
the estimate obtained when using DEXPOSURE (Column 1)— is similar to that implied
by the graph. It suggests that, as a result of the new policy, the share of actors in the
lightest skin category increased by about 8% among films in the top exposure decile.
Results from continuous EXPOSURE metrics suggest that this eﬀect may have been as
large as 22%, for the films with highest measure exposure.
As we noted in Section 3.2, the announcement of the new policy was preceded by
a series of legal disputes and sustained pressure by the US to get China to relax (or
eliminate) restrictions on foreign film importation. This leads us to question whether,
observing this sequence of events, Hollywood studios may have anticipated the 2012 re-
laxation and accordingly adapted film design in years prior. To address this question we
estimate:
SHARELIGHTi = α +
∑
t′≥2010
βt′EXPOSUREi × 1[t(i) = t′] +ΘXi + λt(i) + ϵi
Here, the parameter vector {β2010, .., β2015} picks up the pattern by which the LSS un-
folded across successive film cohorts. (β2009 is normalized to zero to avoid collinearity.)
Anticipatory eﬀects would be reflected by βˆt > 0, for some t < 2014.
Estimates are shown in Table 6. Because statistical significance arises only among
the 2014 and 2015 cohorts, these suggest that there were no anticipatory eﬀects. We also
note that the LSS seems to have unfolded gradually in 2014-2015. In particular, we obtain
35For instance, since the Aﬀordable Care Act became eﬀective in 2010, there has been a steadily
declining trend in the rates of uninsured young adults (McMorrow et al., 2015), increasing the propensity
of this population segment to quit their jobs and pursue independent professional endeavors. In fact, some
evidence (Bailey, 2017; Blumberg et al., 2014) suggests that, by reducing the dependency employer-based
health insurance, this trend may have had a positive impact on rates of entrepreneurship. Therefore, to
the extent that the decline of uninsurance rates varied across individuals of diﬀerent races, it is possible
to conceive an impact on the relative supply of light- and dark-skinned actors. Furthermore, insofar
declining uninsurance rates increased disposable income for some segments more than for others, studios
may have adjusted design characteristics (including casting) to better compete for these audiences.
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0 < βˆ2014 < βˆ2015, across EXPOSURE metrics. This pattern could be rationalized, for
example, if at the time the new policy was announced, a greater share of castings had been
defined for the 2014 than the 2015 cohort of films. In turn, this result insinuates that the
magnitude of the LSS may have continued to grow during following years. Lastly, note
that these results also imply that “pre-trends” did not diﬀer based on shock exposure.36
6.2 Robustness and Falsification
6.2.1 Robustness
Here we address a series of caveats about the above results. To save space, unless noted,
supporting tables and figures are presented in the Appendix.
We start by noting that one could be concerned that the skin-color coding procedure
introduces a violation of ϵ’s independence assumption. This would be a particularly
serious problem if coding errors favored light-skin coding among actors that appear in
“post” films with high exposure to the shock. This pattern would entail an upward
bias on βˆ, and potentially lead us to conclude that there was a LSS when in fact there
was none. This violation is a-priori unlikely because many actors star in both “pre”
and “post” films, with diﬀerent degrees of shock exposure. We nevertheless assembled
the distributions of within-actor coding discrepancies, across exposure levels and periods.
The cited violation would be reflected by a DEXPOSURE=POST=1 distribution with
relatively higher skewness. However, all distributions have the same roughly symmetric
shape.
Next, we reproduced our main results of Table 5, but instead categorizing actors’ skin
color according to the median score awarded by MTurk coders. Estimates are similar
and statistical significance is preserved. We then considered alternative exposure metrics,
computed from the diﬀerent subsamples and specifications for the China entry Probit.
Results remain largely robust. We proceeded to implemented a bootstrapping procedure
to account for the stochasticity of the exposure metrics.37 The resulting distributions yield
all strictly-positive β estimates (p = 0), with medians that closely trace the estimates of
Table 5.
Lastly, we replicated the analysis using a matched-samples approach instead. Based on
the vector of observed characteristicsX, we partitioned the sample of films into groups g =
1, .., G using k-means clustering. With these, we computed∆g = E[SHARELIGHT|g,POST=
36Estimating the model on 2009-2013 data only, a test for the joint significance of these coeﬃcients yields
p-values of 0.96, 0.49, and 0.57, respectively for DEXPOSURE, CEXPOSURE1, and CEXPOSURE2.
37We generated 1,000 pseudo-samples, re-sampling (with replacement) in each case the same number
of films released in 2009-2012. Using each of these pseudo-samples, we re-estimated the model of Table
2, Column 1, and constructed the exposure metrics for all films. We then took each of these to the full
sample and re-estimated specification (1).
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1]−E[SHARELIGHT|g,POST= 0]. The analysis presented in the Appendix suggested the
use of G = 190, which left us with 176 matched observations. We then regressed this dif-
ference on a constant and the exposure variable, which is now defined at the cluster level,
computed based on cluster-specific averages of X, and has the same interpretation as
before. Results are presented by Table 7. The small value of the constant suggests that
observations were overall closely matched, and that the “pre/post” diﬀerences in aver-
age SHARELIGHT values are solely mediated by films’ degree of exposure to the shock.
These results reaﬃrm those obtained from our baseline DiD approach.
6.2.2 Falsification
To further investigate the validity of the causal interpretation of β, we carried out three
falsification tests. In the first of these we dropped films released in 2013-2015 and imposed
2011 as a falsified date for the policy change. That is, we are falsely assuming that the
2011 and 2012 film cohorts were produced after the policy change was announced. The
resulting coeﬃcient estimates are presented in Panel A of Table 8. They show that our
DiD regression correctly delivers a statistically insignificant βˆ.
Our second test focused on the 110 Animation films in the sample. In most cases,
an actor’s physical characteristics do not map into the characteristics of the animated
character that he or she plays —the actor’s contribution to the films is almost entirely
circumscribed to his or her voice. Furthermore, as it can be seen from a quick Google
Images search for the query “Animation Film Posters,” images of starring actors tend
to not appear in promotional material. Therefore, the heightened relevance of Chinese
coloristic preferences should have been less important for the casting of these actors. Panel
B of the Table presents the results. Resulting βˆ values imply a consistently null eﬀect.
Lastly, we implement a test that exploits the same rough logic, but which focuses
on the casting outcomes among the 324 voice roles observed in the sample. As with
Animation films, coloristic preferences should be less important in this case. Using a
Probit model, we tested whether the probability these roles are played by a light-skinned
actor (k = 1) increased as a result of the new policy. Estimates are presented in Panel C.
Again, these show consistently null eﬀects.
6.3 Endogenous Design Characteristics
6.3.1 Observable Characteristics
As pointed out earlier, our main inference may be confounded by studios’ ability to
choose films’ design characteristics. In particular, after the new policy was announced,
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some studios may have decided to redirect their innovation towards sets of characteristics
that are more amenable to Chinese audiences.
To see the problem, consider an example. Our results of subsection 5.2 showed that
Action and large-budget films are more likely to enter China. Also recall our running
example of films inspired on World Wars, which are usually associated to the Action genre,
and better suited for light-skinned characters. If, in response to the new policy, studios
began to more often allocate large budgets to World War films, these will be associated
with generally higher EXPOSURE values in the “post” period. In this scenario, the
documented LSS may not be entirely rooted on an alteration of casting guidelines, but
also on the “artificial inflation” of EXPOSURE among this type of films, which is better
suited for light-skinned characters.
Before addressing this issue empirically, we must note that, although studios “choose
X,” they do so under constraints. In particular, large studios (which produce most of
the highly-exposed films in the sample) employ “portfolio strategies” aimed at curtailing
their aggregate risk exposure (Vogel, 2014). These strategies limit the extent to which
design characteristics X can be re-shuﬄed across films within a studio’s portfolio, as
diversification will usually require them to cover diﬀerent genres (Perretti and Negro, 2007)
and budget levels (Pokorny and Sedgwick, 2010). Furthermore, because films targeting
Chinese audiences are riskier (China entry cannot be assured), they may reinforce the
need to maintain well-diversified portfolios.
To evaluate this “redirection hypothesis” we present Figure 7, which displays the cu-
mulative distributions of new films along the support of predicted China entry probabili-
ties. Blue lines correspond to distributions obtained on the subsample of films produced
before the new policy was announced (“pre” films); red lines, to those obtained from the
subsample of films produced after it (“post” films).38
The “redirection hypothesis” would be reflected here by a distribution of “post” films
that places relatively more mass on higher spectra of predicted entry probabilities. That is,
we should observe that “post” distribution first-order stochastically dominates the “pre”
distribution. However, we observe almost no diﬀerence. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for
the equality of continuous distributions confirms this graphical finding. In the Appendix
we include regression-based analysis which provides evidence to the same point. Thus,
this result suggests that the new policy did not cause a “Chinese-oriented redirection”
of overall innovation patterns, which in turn alleviates the concerns stemming from the
potential endogeneity of X.
38For robustness we have added dashed lines corresponding to distributions for variations of the con-
sidered sample periods.
24
6.3.2 Unobservable Characteristics
Our results so far indicate that, although the new policy prompted studios to use dif-
ferent casting criteria, it did not prompt them to choose more “China-oriented” vectors
of observable characteristics X. Nevertheless, studios may have adjusted other design
characteristics that are not observed in the data. Although this hypothesis cannot be
completely ruled out, it is possible to address a milder version of it. Namely, one focusing
on a leading form of unobservable design characteristic: storylines. Here we test this
hypothesis. We find no support for it.
It is important to first highlight that such impact on storylines would not be incon-
sistent with cultural accommodation. This impact would nevertheless blur the interpre-
tation of the LSS —it would suggest that, at least in part, the LSS may have been the
sub-product of a shift to storylines that are better suited for light-skinned characters.
Since we do not observe this impact on storylines, we revert to interpreting the LSS as a
directly controlled outcome. In particular, as an alteration of casting guidelines “holding
storylines constant.”
Our empirical test relies on a measure of storyline-similarity between pairs of films. To
generate a similarity metric, we draw from Eliashberg et al. (2007) and Eliashberg et al.
(2014), who apply natural-language processing to films’ text descriptions. In particular,
these authors use a “Bag-of-Words” (BW) approach to systematically address the nature
of films’ storylines and covered themes, information which then proves helpful to predict
commercial performance.
As emphasized by the first of these articles (and implemented by the second), natural-
language processing techniques would be ideally applied to scripts, which provide rich
descriptions of films’ storylines. However, scripts are not publicly available on a system-
atic basis.39 Thus, like in Eliashberg et al. (2007), we apply BW to shorter texts that
summarize storylines. In particular, we use IMDb’s “summary plot” and “synopsis” en-
tries, which are available on a reasonably systematic basis. Plots are shorter and less
structured than synopsis.40 Many films have more than one summary plot posted on the
website whereas, when available, there is only one synopsis. After discarding non-usable
entries, plots are available for about 80% of non-Animation films in the sample; synopsis,
for about 44%.
BW codifies each text description as a vector of word densities. Film similarity can
then be assessed by comparing the distributions contained thereby. To make these com-
parisons we employ the “Cosine similarity” metric, which is commonly used for this pur-
pose due to its intuitive formulation (Singhal, 2001). Namely, this metric approaches zero
39Eliashberg et al. (2014) get around this by constructing a sample from (300) publicly available scripts.
40Plots are written by IMDb users. Although IMDb does not clarify the source of films’ synopsis, it is
likely that they are provided by the producers.
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for highly dissimilar vectors, and one for highly similar ones. Intermediate values codify
intermediate degrees of similarity. To avoid common confounds, we run the algorithm on
a pre-processed dataset.41 For every pair of text descriptions (i, j), we label the resulting
variable SIMILARITYij.
The resulting distribution of SIMILARITY provides some validation for the approach.
For example, even though used texts do not include films’ titles, there is a strong con-
vergence of themes among pairs with highest SIMILARITY values.42 Furthermore, the
average plot-SIMILARITY among same-film pairs is over five standard deviations larger
than that for diﬀerent-film pairs. A final piece of validatory evidence is available from the
idea that higher SIMILARITY values should be expected from pairs of films associated
to the same sets of genres, or which exhibit similar types of sensitive content.43 That is,
SIMILARITY should decrease with the “distance” between two films’ genre and sensitive
content profiles. To verify this, we measured this distance through the Euclidean norm
of vectors of genre and sensitive content indicators (respectively ||XGij || and ||XCij ||), and
estimated:
SIMILARITYij = γ + φ||XGij ||+ ϕ||XCij ||+ ϵ,
Our hypothesis is supported by negative, statistically significant estimates for φ and ϕ.
These results are presented in the Appendix.
Using SIMILARITY, we now test whether higher shock exposure can be linked to
larger changes in films’ storylines. We rely on the clustering procedure used before, which
partitioned the sample of films into groups g = 1, .., 190 based on their observable design
characteristicsX. We construct a sample composed of unique, non-ordered film pairs (i, j)
that belong to the same group g. We further restrict the sample to the set of pairs which
either include two films produced before the policy change, or which include one produced
before and the other after it. That is, we consider the sample in which each observation
is a pair of films in the set {(i, j) : i ̸= j, g(i) = g(j),POST(t(i)) × POST(t(j)) = 0}.
Defining CROSSPERij = 1[max{POST(t(i)),POST(t(j))} = 1] to identify pairs that
include one film produced after the policy change, we estimate:
SIMILARITYij = α + βEXPOSUREg × CROSSPERij + µg + ϵ,
41We applied three filters. First, we removed punctuation and “stop words,” which are common words
that usually do not add meaning to the text (e.g., “a,” “and,” “is,” “the”). Second, we applied a
“stemming” procedure, aimed at distilling a base from derivatives and inflectional forms. For example,
after the stemming procedure is applied, “cars,” “car’s” and “cars’ ” are all be replaced by “car.” Lastly,
we removed personal names. In preliminary runs, we found that personal names artificially inflated
measured similarity between films. We removed them using the list of each film’s characters and a library
of personal names.
42Three of the ten most similar pairs correspond to sequels, while among most of the remaining, both
films develop the same, distinctive topic (e.g., rodeo, vampires, witch hunts).
43For example, the storylines of many thrillers revolve around a crime, while many comedies are inspired
on stories about college.
26
where µg represents a cluster-specific fixed eﬀect. A stand-alone EXPOSURE variable
is omitted because µg makes it redundant. As in our earlier analysis, EXPOSURE is
computed based on cluster-specific averages. Recall that, since all pairs in the constructed
sample have been matched on X, including these as independent variables does not add
much information.44 With this, β picks the potential impacts of the policy change on
storylines. In particular, this parameter captures the potential role of EXPOSURE as
mediator of cross-period diﬀerences in SIMILARITY. An estimate βˆ < 0 would indicate
that storylines were altered a consequence of the policy change.
Panel A of Table 9 presents the results obtained from the plots data. These suggest
that storylines were not impacted. Results obtained from the synopsis data (Panel B)
yield the same conclusion. This finding is supported by further results presented in
Appendix, which rely on a more sophisticated natural-language processing technique,
“Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency” (TF-IDF), which gives more weight to
words that are more frequent in a particular document, and less weight to those are more
frequent in the entire collection of texts in the sample (Leskovec et al., 2014). Thus, we
conclude that the policy change did not alter the nature of storylines developed by films
targeting the Chinese market. In turn, this conclusion supports interpreting of the LSS
as the result of a direct control of casting guidelines.
6.4 A Superstar Shift?
The distribution of actors’ skin colors in the sample (Figure 2) shows that the majority of
star actors have a generally light skin tone. Based on this observation, one may wonder
whether the LSS was motivated by the more frequent casting of more popular/famous
actors (superstars), but who happen to be light-skinned. If this “superstar shift” hypoth-
esis was true, we should conclude that the LSS was not motivated by the strive to cast
more pale-skinned stars, but instead, more popular ones.
Before turning to our analysis, we note that, although entirely plausible, the “superstar
shift” could be tempered by supply- and demand-side factors. Namely, by definition, there
is a limited number of superstars, who can appear in a limited number of films. From a
demand perspective, superstars may also be “too expensive” to be used as a “wink” to
Chinese audiences, particularly given that entry into that market cannot be assured.
To address this question we retrieved IMDb’s “Starmeter” data, which has been pre-
viously used as a proxy for actors’ fame/popularity (Mathys et al., 2016; Karniouchina,
2011). IMDb describes this metric as a measure of “what people are interested in, based
not on small statistical samplings, but on the actual behavior of millions of IMDb users.”
The website constructs it using proprietary, undisclosed methods, based on the in-site
44Specifically, results do not change when we also include ||XGij || and ||XCij ||.
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search behavior of the over 250 million monthly IMDb users. The resulting metric en-
ables a ranking, with lower values indicating higher popularity.
We obtained complete “Starmeter” series for each actor in the sample. Values are
reported at the weekly level. Reflecting promotional activities and viewership, these series
exhibit considerable short-time variation, which we mute by averaging within years. For
each actor/film combination, we consider this value during the year prior to the film’s
release. For an actor a featuring in film i, we label this variable as FAMEai. Given the
definition of the Starmeter metric, lower values of FAME indicate higher popularity.
To investigate the validity of FAME, we first look at the number of roles played by
each actor. Here, we would expect more famous actors to play a larger number of roles.
Data confirm this prediction.45 Next, we consider films’ budget levels. In this case, we
would expect higher-budget films to cast more famous actors. The data also confirm this
prediction, by showing that films with top 25% and top 10% budgets are much more likely
to cast the 10% and 1% more popular stars. The supporting table is presented in the
Appendix.
Our test relies on the variable SHARELIGHT FAME90i, which is computed as the
share of star actors in a film i, who both (i) belong the lightest-skin category (k = 1),
and (ii) belong to the 90% less popular actors within the set of all those starring in films
released on a given year. That is, SHARELIGHT FAME90 reflects the participation of
light-skinned, non-superstar actors in each film. We then regress SHARELIGHT FAME90
on specification (1). An estimate βˆ > 0 would lead us to conclude that the LSS was not
driven by a shift towards light-skinned superstars, and thus reject the “superstar shift”
hypothesis.
Panel A of Table 10 shows the estimated coeﬃcients. These point to βˆ > 0, prompting
the rejection of the “superstar shift” hypothesis. In fact, these estimates are somewhat
larger than those obtained from the baseline SHARELIGHT variable, suggesting that the
LSS may have represented a stronger turn towards not-so-popular light-skinned actors.
Panel B shows analog results for SHARELIGHT FAME99, which is constructed analo-
gously, but focusing on the 99% less popular actors. These results also suggest that the
hypothesis should be rejected.
Although Chinese people have for some time now been able access to IMDb, it is
possible that Starmeter data do not accurately reflect popularity in China. To evaluate
whether this caveat changes our results, we would ideally employ a variable like the IMDb’s
Starmeter, but which is constructed based on the browsing behavior of Chinese people
only. Having been unable to identify such data, we leverage the available information
45Actors in the decile of highest popularity play an average of 4.8 roles; those in the next decile, 3.1;
those in the decile that follows, 2.3. This monotonic progression continues to hold as we move down in
the rank of measured fame. The average number of roles played by actors in the lowest-popularity decile
is 1.1. These results also hold when we consider actors’ mean FAME in the sample.
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from IMDb.
Following the results of Mathys et al. (2016) —which suggest that an actor’s previous
number of roles increases consumer interest in his/her personal brand— we adjust FAME
by each actor’s number starring roles in China releases previous to the release of film i
(PREVCHINAROLESai).46 We construct CHINAFAMEai as:
CHINAFAMEai =
FAMEai
1 + PREVCHINAROLESai
,
Notice that, because lower values of FAME represent higher popularity, a larger value
of PREVCHINAROLES increases the popularity in China that is measured by CHI-
NAFAME.47 Using this variable, we construct and analyze SHARELIGHT CHINAFAME90
and SHARELIGHT CHINAFAME99 as before. Panels C and D of Table 10 present the
results. Although estimates are somewhat smaller and estimated less precisely, they still
evidence the LSS. We conclude that, although Chinese popularity seems to have sustained
part of the LSS, it did not drive the eﬀect.
6.5 Composition
Our review of Coloristic preferences in China suggested that these may manifest more like
a “light skin premium” than a “dark skin penalty,” and that the pale-skin standard may
be more stringent for female than male beauty. In this section we investigate the whether
the composition of the LSS supports these insights.
To implement this analysis we construct a dataset with observations defined at the role
(r = 1, .., R) level. That is, observations correspond to unique film/actor combinations.
We then divide this dataset in two subsamples, one corresponding to all the roles played
by females; the other, to those played by males. As in our main analysis, we drop voice
roles and Animation films. In the resulting sample, there are 2,779 male actors, who play
5,683 roles. There are 1,863 actresses, who play 3,541 roles. In the Appendix we show
that the policy change did not alter proportion of roles played by each.
For the lightest (k = 1) and darkest (k = 4) skin-color categories, we define the
indicator ykr = 1[The individual who plays role r belongs to skin color category k], and
estimate the following equation separately on each subsample:
ykr = f(α + βEXPOSUREi(r) × POSTt(i(r)) +ΘXi(r) + λt(i(r))),
where f corresponds to the Probit functional form. When estimated using y1r on the sub-
46To construct PREVCHINAROLES we use casting data for films released 2005-2015, and which satisfy
the same popularity criteria as in our main sample.
47We add one in the numerator because PREVCHINAROLES equals zero in the majority of cases.
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sample of female roles, an estimate βˆ > 0 would suggest that the policy change increased
the probability that female roles are played by light-skinned actresses. Analogously, if we
were to obtain βˆ < 0 on the same subsample, but instead using y4r as dependent variable,
we should conclude that the policy change led to a decrease in the probability of female
roles being played by actresses that belong to the darkest skin-color category. While
both these results would be consistent with the LSS, only the former would support the
“light-skin premium” view.
Results are shown by Table 11. Panels A (for y1r) and B (for y
4
r) refer to the subsample
of female roles; Panels C and D, to that of male roles.48 Consistent with the more
important role of pale skin for female beauty standards, patterns of statistical significance
suggest that the LSS primarily unfolded through female roles. Furthermore, this eﬀect
is shown to have manifested through the more frequent casting of pale-skinned actresses
rather than the less frequent casting of those with dark-most skin colors. The estimate of
Column 1 in Panel A implies that, evaluated at the mean, the probability that a female
role of a DEXPOSURE=1 film is played by one of the former, increased by about 12% as
a consequence of the policy change.
6.6 Were Gatekeepers Responsible for the Light-Skin Shift?
We have previously emphasized that China entry outcomes depend on the composition
of preferences of Chinese audiences and gatekeeping authorities. Even though the stated
ideological mandate faced by the latter does not oﬀer grounds to suspect that they may
impose a coloristic bias on entry or censorship outcomes, one may still wonder if, at least
in part, their preferences may drive the documented LSS. Here we test this hypothesis.
Results suggest that gatekeepers do not impose a coloristic bias, which leads us to conclude
that the LSS was fundamentally driven by the preferences of Chinese audiences.
Our test compares patterns of film entry into China against those into two “control”
markets, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Due to their deep cultural connections, these three
markets are likely to have similar preferences, particularly coloristic ones. Moreover,
because Taiwan and Hong Kong do not restrict film imports, a comparison thereof can
shed some light regarding the potential biases imposed by the gatekeepers of the Chinese
market.
Despite the existence of many non-trivial diﬀerences across these markets, the exis-
tence of a relatively large degree of cultural similarity can be argued on the grounds of
a shared history. First and foremost, recall that the degree of political independence
that Hong Kong and Taiwan today have has been achieved in relatively recent historic
48The number of observations in Panel B (D) is smaller than that in Panel A (C) because, due to the
lower frequency of actors in the darkest skin-color category, the dependent variable is sometimes perfectly
predicted by some combinations of X.
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times, over two millennia after coloristic preferences were forged (Diko¨tter, 1992). Today,
populations remain ethnically similar and overwhelmingly homogeneous across the three
markets: over 90% of the population of each is ethnic Han.49 Furthermore, skin-whitening
cosmetics are about equally important for all of them (World Health Organization, 2011;
Tan, 2012). Importantly, however, in contrast to the Chinese case, film imports into Tai-
wan and Hong Kong are largely unregulated. Thus, entry outcomes into these markets
are fundamentally driven by the preferences of their audiences.50
In our data, the openness of the Hong Kong and Taiwanese markets is reflected by
the total entry statistics, which appear at the bottom of the Table 12.51 Despite that the
Chinese market is about 25 times larger than each of the other two, the number films
that enter them is at least double that of films that enter China. Statistics in this table
also insinuate a high degree of preference overlap. For example, out of all the films that
entered either Hong Kong or Taiwan, over 55% entered both of these markets. In addition,
only 30 out of the 248 films that entered China entered neither Hong Kong nor Taiwan.
As a comparison, when we instead consider two diﬀerent Asian markets, Vietnam and
Thailand, this number is more than double.
To investigate the hypothesis of interest we first consider the China entry Probit
model of subsection 5.2. We enrich its specification by adding SHARELIGHT and an
indicator activated for films that enter either Taiwan or Hong Kong (TWHKENTRY).52
By including the latter, the specification controls for the common appeal of the films’
overall design across markets. Because stars’ skin color is part of this overall design,
and Hong Kong and Taiwan do not have gatekeepers, the coeﬃcient of SHARELIGHT
captures the potential coloristic bias of Chinese gatekeepers. Table 13 presents the results,
for three variants of the used specification. Because the coeﬃcients for SHARELIGHT
and its interaction with POST are statistically insignificant, neither set of results supports
the alleged bias of Chinese authorities.
A potential weakness of this test is that it implicitly assumes that all China entry
outcomes in the sample contain useful information. If not all films attempted to enter
49In China, this is about 92% (People’s Republic of China, 2010); in Taiwan, more than 95% (De-
partment of Information Services, Executive Yuan, 2014); in Hong Kong, about 94% (Population Census
Oﬃce, 2011). For comparison with other countries in which the Han ethnicity has a significant presence,
these percentages are 76% in Singapore (Department of Information Services, Executive Yuan, 2014) and
23% in Malaysia (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2016).
50Taiwan first lifted the importation quota and relaxed print control during the 1980s (Wang, 2003),
while other restrictions were dropped when Taiwan joined the WTO in 2001. In 2011, 97% of box-
oﬃce revenues in this market were generated by foreign movies (Jaﬀe, 2011). Hong Kong, on the other
hand, has historically displayed large degrees of trade openness and become a theatrical hub for the
region. (Current US oﬃcial reports do not mention restrictions for entry into this market. See http:
//2016.export.gov/hongkong/eg_hk_027494.asp). In 2016, over 80% of all films screened in Hong
Kong were foreign (HKTDC Research, 2017).
51We identified films released in Hong Kong and Taiwan as previously done for China. That is, we
excluded limited and festival releases, and others that do not entail broad access by general audiences.
52Because the focus of this analysis is entry (as opposed to design), we also include non-fully controllable
design characteristics (MPAA ratings, awards), and define POST as 1[t ≥ 2013].
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China, the influence of the hypothesized bias could be muted by the variation along other
design dimensions.53 To address this issue, we restrict the attention to the 916 films
released in at least one of three markets. Note that, when comparing a film i’s entry
outcome into China and into a market m (Hong Kong, Taiwan), there are three possible
outcomes, described by the definition of the variable z:
zim =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
3 if i enters China but not m
2 if i enters m and China
1 if i enters m but not China
Under the hypothesized bias, higher SHARELIGHT values would foster the transition
from the first to the second outcome and, in extreme cases, to the third.
Our second test rationalizes the variation of z with the following specification:
zim = f(α + βSHARELIGHTi +ΘXi + λt(i)),
where f corresponds to Ordered Probit functional form, X represents the set observable
design characteristics, and λ are release-year fixed eﬀects. Parameter β captures the role of
SHARELIGHT as mediator of diﬀerential entry outcomes. The hypothesized bias would
be supported by a positive estimate of this parameter.54 Table 14 presents the obtained
results. Again here, the lack of statistical significance means that results support neither
a baseline coloristic bias of Chinese gatekeepers, nor an accentuation thereof following the
enactment of the new policy.
We conclude by noting that the relevance of coloristic preferences among Chinese
audiences could be investigated in a more direct way using revenue data, and guided by
the question “do films with higher SHARELIGHT values produce superior competitive
outcomes in China relative to in the US?” Such strategy would face the usual hurdles of
demand estimation, which in this case would include endogenous allocation of promotional
resources and release configurations (e.g., number and types of screens in which the film
is shown, and the amount of time it is shown for). It would also face the doubts cast by
allegations of manipulations of box-oﬃce figures in China (Lang, 2017). We are assembling
a dataset to pursue this approach in future research.
53For example, the coeﬃcient of SHARELIGHT in the above specification is forced to rationalize China
entry outcomes for low-budget horror films, which tend to not enter China for reasons other than the
potential coloristic bias of authorities (Martinsen, 2010).
54As before, because the focus in entry (as opposed to design), we define POST=1[t ≥ 2013].
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7 Conclusion
Discussing the China release of “Transformers: Age of Extintion” (2014), the Sony Pic-
tures executive Nigel Clark wrote:
The seamless integration of the Chinese elements mentioned above, without
the appearance of tokenism, is perhaps the most important key to the appeal
of the film to the mainstream Chinese audience.55
In this paper we have shown that, beyond anecdote, many large Hollywood productions
have accommodated their design to elements of the Chinese culture. Whereas in the above
statement, Clark primarily refers to a kind of childhood memories that are deeply held by
many Chinese adults, we illustrate the point through another distinctive, although more
generalized and socially sensitive element of their culture: a marked aesthetic preference
for light skin.
The influence of Chinese culture is taken here as an example of a wider-ranged phe-
nomenon: the economic rise and integration of emerging markets has created an influx of
“newly endowed” consumers into the global demand for products and services. Because
these consumers are known to considerably diﬀer from their counterparts of developed
markets in many cultural and behavioral respects, their “global activation” may also
imply a shift of aggregate preferences in the total addressable market for international
products and services, and thus condition their optimal design.
Although marketing scholars have widely acknowledged and explored the nature and
implications of these diﬀerences, these have not yet been shown to have the type of first-
order, unexpected global impact that we demonstrate. Like Chandy and Narasimhan
(2015) —who state that “the changes that are happening in emerging markets today are
unprecedented –in scale, scope, and speed– in human history”— we interpret this finding
as a testament to their newly acquired global influence, and ensuing relevance for the
practice of international marketing.
Our main result —a light-skin shift among Hollywood starring casts— is supported by
various pieces of evidence and extensive robustness checks. Yet, an important question
remains. To which extent did this light-skin shift pay-oﬀ for Hollywood studios? Consid-
ering that box-oﬃce performance in China continues to be a hit-or-miss for Hollywood
productions,56 there is a real possibility that studios may not yet fully grasp the deter-
55See https://wikileaks.org/sony/emails/emailid/62426.
56The are several examples of films that have dramatically over- or under-performed in China relative
to pre-release expectations. For example, Mendelson (2017b) claims that “Arthur: Legend of the Sword”
(2017) and “Power Rangers” (2017) “got their butts kicked” in their opening weekends in China, further
stating that the case of “Power Rangers” was a “real tragedy.” In contrast, the unexpected China success
of “Pacific Rim” (2013) has been pointed by Lee (2016) as the main factor behind its upcoming sequel.
The same article states that in 2013, this seemed an “unlikely proposition.”
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minants of success in that market. Data limitations and multiple layers of endogeneity
make this a diﬃcult empirical question, however. We must therefore leave this question
for future research.
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Figures
Figure 1: Number of Films: Sample Total (US) and Releases in China (CH)
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Total releases depicted by bars are computed based on films’ US release date. Releases in China are
computed based on films’ date of release in that market.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Color Codes Among the Sample of 5,442 Coded Starring Actors
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Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities of China Entry and Shock Exposure Metrics
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Predicted entry probabilities and EXPOSURE metrics are computed based on the estimates of Table 2,
Column 1.
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Figure 5: Average Shares of Light-Skinned Star Actors by Degree of Exposure to the
Policy Change.
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Figure 6: Average Fraction of All-Light-Skinned-Stars Films.
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Figure 7: Film Distribution Along the Support of China Entry Probabilities.
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Predicted probabilities of China entry are computed from estimates of Table 2, Column 1.
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Tables
Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Genre Indicators Format Indicator
Action 0.19 0.39 3D/IMAX 0.05 0.21
Adventure 0.11 0.31 Production Indicators
Animation 0.03 0.18 USONLYFILM 0.77 0.42
Comedy 0.34 0.47 CHINESESTAR 0.00 0.07
Crime 0.14 0.35 CHINESECOPROD 0.01 0.12
Drama 0.48 0.50 BIG6STUDIO 0.37 0.48
Family 0.07 0.25 P75BUDGET 0.26 0.44
Fantasy 0.08 0.27 P90BUDGET 0.10 0.30
Horror 0.21 0.41 Major Awards
Mystery 0.10 0.30 AWRNOM 0.59 2.61
Romance 0.18 0.38 AWRWON 0.15 0.90
Science Fiction 0.11 0.31 China Entry Indicator
Thriller 0.34 0.47 CHINAENTRY 0.09 0.28
Other 0.11 0.31 Color Coded Star Actors
Sensitive Content Indicators n1 1.85 0.94
Sex 0.38 0.49 n2 0.74 0.79
Nudity 0.16 0.37 n3 0.11 0.37
Violence 0.35 0.48 n4 0.11 0.37
Drug use 0.19 0.40 N (total) 2.83 0.43
Strong language 0.55 0.50
MPAA Rating Indicators
PG 0.07 0.26
PG-13 0.21 0.40
R 0.44 0.50
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Table 2: Probit Specifications for CHINAENTRY.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2009-2012 2009-2015
Production Indicators
3D/IMAX 0.94*** 0.88*** 0.79*** 0.74***
(0.22) (0.23) (0.16) (0.16)
BIG6STUDIO -0.08 -0.23 -0.01 -0.08
(0.17) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12)
P75BUDGET 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.68*** 0.63***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13)
P90BUDGET 1.08*** 1.06*** 1.02*** 0.96***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13)
CHINESECOPROD 0.96*** 1.00*** 0.92*** 0.95***
(0.37) (0.39) (0.27) (0.28)
CHINESESTAR 1.36*** 1.45*** 1.10** 1.19**
(0.44) (0.46) (0.48) (0.48)
USONLYFILM -0.55*** -0.54*** -0.59*** -0.56***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10)
Genre Indicators
Action 0.56*** 0.61*** 0.38*** 0.42***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.11) (0.12)
Adventure 0.35** 0.35** 0.30** 0.27**
(0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13)
Animation 0.43 0.52* 0.45** 0.51**
(0.27) (0.29) (0.22) (0.23)
Comedy -0.69*** -0.77*** -0.47*** -0.47***
(0.21) (0.22) (0.15) (0.14)
Crime -0.18 -0.12 -0.15 -0.09
(0.19) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14)
Drama -0.15 -0.20 -0.27** -0.30***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11)
Family 0.58** 0.75** 0.26 0.37*
(0.23) (0.30) (0.18) (0.20)
Fantasy -0.25 -0.29 -0.24* -0.21
(0.19) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14)
Horror -1.15*** -1.01*** -1.40*** -1.31***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22)
Mystery 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.20
(0.19) (0.20) (0.15) (0.15)
Romance 0.43*** 0.41** 0.15 0.11
(0.17) (0.18) (0.14) (0.14)
SciFi -0.02 -0.04 0.24* 0.23*
(0.18) (0.20) (0.13) (0.13)
Thriller 0.38** 0.44** 0.25** 0.26**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.12)
Other -0.12 -0.28 0.03 -0.05
(0.21) (0.22) (0.14) (0.14)
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Table 2 (Continued): Probit Specifications for CHINAENTRY.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2009-2012 2009-2015
Sensitive Content Indicators
Sex 0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.10
(0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13)
Nudity -0.34 -0.27 -0.25* -0.19
(0.21) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15)
Violence 0.36** 0.33** 0.28*** 0.22*
(0.15) (0.17) (0.11) (0.12)
Drug Use 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06
(0.18) (0.19) (0.14) (0.13)
Strong Language -0.08 -0.09 0.06 0.05
(0.15) (0.17) (0.11) (0.12)
MPAA Ratings
PG 0.38 0.18
(0.33) (0.23)
PG-13 0.58** 0.43**
(0.28) (0.20)
R 0.19 0.16
(0.29) (0.22)
Major Awards
AWRNOM -0.05 -0.00
(0.04) (0.02)
AWRWON 0.35*** 0.12*
(0.10) (0.07)
Constant -1.95*** -2.25*** -1.85*** -2.01***
(0.22) (0.26) (0.17) (0.19)
Observations 1,812 1,812 3,378 3,378
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Pierson correlations for predicted China entry probabilities under diﬀerent spec-
ifications.
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) 2009-2010 1
(2) 2009-2010† 0.97 1
(3) 2009-2012 0.97 0.94 1
(4) 2009-2012† 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
(5) 2013-2015 0.91 0.88 0.95 0.93 1
(6) 2013-2015† 0.91 0.87 0.95 0.92 0.99 1
(7) 2009-2015 0.95 0.92 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.98 1
(8) 2009-2015† 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.99 1
All correlations are computed with all films in the sample and are significant at a 1% confidence level.
†Model includes award and MPAA ratings variables.
Table 4: Average SHARELIGHT values.
DEXPOSURE = 0 DEXPOSURE = 1
PRE (t ≤ 2013) 0.65 0.65
(0.32) (0.31)
POST (t ≥ 2014) 0.66 0.72
(0.32) (0.31)
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
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Table 5: Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Specifications for SHARELIGHT.
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
EXPOSURE×POST 0.08** 0.13** 0.22**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.10)
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
Observations 3,268 3,268 3,268
EXPOSURE metrics are computed with the estimates Table 2, Column 1. Estimated models include
release-year fixed eﬀects as well as the controls X used in the China entry specification referenced above.
Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p <
0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 6: Temporal Unfolding of the “Light-Skin Shift.”
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
EXPOSURE ×1[t = 2010] 0.02 0.12 0.19
(0.06) (0.09) (0.22)
[0.66] [0.18] [0.40]
EXPOSURE ×1[t = 2011] 0.03 0.12 0.26
(0.05) (0.09) (0.23)
[0.55] [0.21] [0.25]
EXPOSURE ×1[t = 2012] 0.03 0.13 0.30
(0.06) (0.10) (0.24)
[0.59] [0.19] [0.21]
EXPOSURE ×1[t = 2013] 0.02 0.06 0.00
(0.05) (0.09) (0.28)
[0.68] [0.54] [0.99]
EXPOSURE ×1[t = 2014] 0.09* 0.19** 0.29*
(0.05) (0.08) (0.17)
[0.10] [0.02] [0.08]
EXPOSURE ×1[t = 2015] 0.10* 0.23*** 0.47***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.17)
[0.06] [0.00] [0.01]
Observations 3,268 3,268 3,268
EXPOSURE metrics are computed with the estimates of Table 2, Column 1. Estimated models include
release-year fixed eﬀects as well as the controls X used in the China entry specification referenced above.
Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p <
0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Estimates from the Matched-Samples Procedure.
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
EXPOSURE 0.11** 0.15** 0.19**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
[0.05] [0.02] [0.02]
Constant 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.59] [0.97] [0.81]
Observations 176 176 176
OLS results. The matching procedure is described in the text. Robust standard errors are presented in
parenthesis and p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 8: Falsification Tests.
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
A. 2009-2012 Subsample, POST=1[t ≥ 2011]
EXPOSURE×POST -0.04 0.01 0.21
(0.04) (0.07) (0.18)
[0.33] [0.86] [0.24]
Observations 1,745 1,745 1,745
B. Animation Films
EXPOSURE×POST 0.08 -0.10 -0.33
(0.12) (0.21) (0.63)
[0.51] [0.62] [0.61]
Observations 110 110 110
C. Voice role played by light-skin (k = 1) actor (Probit)
EXPOSURE×POST 0.21 -0.39 -1.22
(0.35) (0.55) (1.43)
[0.55] [0.48] [0.39]
Observations 324 324 324
Panels A and B: OLS specifications. Panel C: Probit specification. EXPOSURE metrics are computed
with the estimates Table 2, Column 1. Estimated models include release-year fixed eﬀects as well as the
controls X used in the China entry specification referenced above. Robust standard errors are presented
in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Storyline Similarity.
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
A. Summary Plots
EXPOSURE × CROSSPER -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.61] [0.36] [0.42]
Constant 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 23,177 23,177 23,177
B. Synopsis
EXPOSURE × CROSSPER 0.004 0.013 0.013
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
[0.56] [0.13] [0.26]
Constant 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.086***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 5,201 5,201 5,201
EXPOSURE metrics are computed with the estimates of Table 2, Column 1. Estimated models include
cluster-specific fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and p-values in brackets.
Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 10: The “Superstar Shift” Hypothesis.
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
A. SHARELIGHT FAME90
EXPOSURE×POST 0.10** 0.18*** 0.35***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.13)
[0.02] [0.00] [0.01]
B. SHARELIGHT FAME99
EXPOSURE×POST 0.08* 0.14** 0.29**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.13)
[0.05] [0.01] [0.03]
C. SHARELIGHT CHINAFAME90
EXPOSURE×POST 0.06 0.10* 0.23*
(0.04) (0.06) (0.13)
[0.14] [0.07] [0.07]
D. SHARELIGHT CHINAFAME99
EXPOSURE×POST 0.06 0.11** 0.21*
(0.04) (0.06) (0.13)
[0.13] [0.05] [0.09]
Observations 3,268 3,268 3,268
OLS estimates for specification (1). Dependent variables are defined in text and listed as each panel’s
title. EXPOSURE metrics are computed with the estimates of Table 2, Column 1. Estimated models
include release-year fixed eﬀects as well as the controls X used in the China entry specification referenced
above. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p <
0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 11: Composition of the Light-Skin Shift.
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
A. Female Role played by light-skinned (k = 1) actress
EXPOSURE×POST 0.41* 0.73** 1.14*
(0.21) (0.31) (0.68)
[0.06] [0.02] [0.09]
Observations 3,541 3,541 3,541
B. Female Role played by dark-skinned (k = 4) actress
EXPOSURE×POST -0.20 -0.07 1.49
(0.41) (0.78) (1.39)
[0.63] [0.93] [0.28]
Observations 3,156 3,156 3,156
C. Male Role played by light-skinned (k = 1) actor
EXPOSURE×POST 0.16 0.25 0.59
(0.12) (0.18) (0.42)
[0.17] [0.16] [0.16]
Observations 5,683 5,683 5,683
D. Male Role played by dark-skinned (k = 4) actor
EXPOSURE×POST -0.10 -0.24 -0.90
(0.20) (0.32) (0.90)
[0.62] [0.45] [0.32]
Observations 5,654 5,654 5,654
Probit specifications. The dependent variables are defined as 1[Female (male) role played by female
(male) actor in skin color category k]. EXPOSURE metrics are computed with the estimates of Table 2,
Column 1. Estimated models include release-year fixed eﬀects as well as the controls X used in the China
entry specification referenced above. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and p-values in
brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Entry into China, Hong-Kong and Taiwan (2009-2015)
Markets Number of Films Percent
China only 30 3.3%
Hong Kong only 200 21.8%
Taiwan only 135 14.7%
China and Hong Kong only 35 3.8%
China and Taiwan only 16 1.8%
Hong Kong and Taiwan only 333 36.4%
China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan 167 18.2%
Total China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan 916 100%
Total China 248
Total Hong Kong 735
Total Taiwan 651
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Table 13: Probability of China Entry as a function of SHARELIGHT and Entry into
Taiwan or Hong Kong.
(1) (2) (3)
HKTWENTRY 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.69***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
SHARELIGHT -0.10 -0.11 -0.23
(0.16) (0.16) (0.20)
[0.54] [0.50] [0.26]
SHARELIGHT × POST 0.26
(0.31)
[0.40]
Release Year Fixed Eﬀects No Yes Yes
Observations 3,268 3,268 3,268
Probit Estimates. Models are estimated on the full sample of film and include the controls X used in the
china entry specifications of odd-number columns in Table 2. POST is implemented as 1 = [t ≥ 2013].
Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p <
0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 14: Diﬀerential Probabilities of Entry into China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
China and Hong Kong China and Taiwan
SHARELIGHT -0.24 -0.29 -0.28 -0.30
(0.19) (0.22) (0.19) (0.26)
[0.20] [0.19] [0.14] [0.24]
SHARELIGHT × POST 0.11 0.04
(0.36) (0.34)
[0.77] [0.91]
Observations 781 781 716 716
Ordered Probit Specifications. Estimated models include release-year fixed eﬀects as well as the controls
X used in the China entry specifications of odd-number columns in Table 2. POST is implemented as
1 = [t ≥ 2013]. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. Legend:
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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APPENDIX
Can Emerging Markets Impact Tilt Global Product
Design? Impacts of Chinese Colorism on Hollywood
Castings
October 2017
1
A. Film Popularity and Availability of Budget Infor-
mation
Table A1: Availability of Film Budget Information and IMDb Popularity Votes.
Budget Number of Percentile of Vote Distribution
Information Films 10 25 50 75 90
Available 1,816 858 2,262 19,886 84,908 207,315
Missing 1,452 622 881 1,869 5,537 15,012
Total 3,268 702 1220 4,573 34,766 119,119
2
B. Distribution of Production Lags
Figure A1: Distribution of Production Lags
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Lags are computed as the number of months between the earliest observed release and the reported
filming start date. Computed with data for 2,377 films for which filming dates are observed.
3
C. Retrieval of Films’ Starring Casts from IMDb
Figure A2 illustrates the retrieval of starring casts for each film, using as an example the
film “Interstellar” (2014). Retrieved starring casts are highlighted by the red rectangle.
Figure A3 presents a promotional poster of the same film, which highlights the actors
retrieved from the IMDb page.
Figure A2: Sample Identification of Starring Casts on IMDb: “Interstellar” (2014)
Source: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0816692
4
Figure A3: Promotional Poster: “Interstellar” (2014)
Source: http://camartin.deviantart.com/art/Interstellar-Poster-Comp-496032882
5
D. Robustness for the “Light-Skin Shift”
D.1 Color-Coding Discrepancies
Figure A4: Distributions of Within-Actor Coding Discrepancies. Considers Starring Ac-
tors Within each set of Films Separately.
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D.2 Classifying Actors Based on the Median (as opposed to Mean)
MTurk Scores
Table A2: OLS Specifications for SHARELIGHT (actors categorized based on median
MTurk scores).
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
EXPOSURE×POST 0.05* 0.11*** 0.23***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08)
[0.07] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 3,268 3,268 3,268
Actors are assigned to skin-color categories based on the median score awarded MTurk coders (as opposed
to based on the average, as in our main analysis). Estimated models include release-year fixed eﬀects
as well as the controls X used in the china entry specification. Robust standard errors are presented in
parenthesis and p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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D.3 Computing Exposure Metrics from Alternative Samples and
Specifications for the China Entry Probit Model
Table A3: Main Results When Exposure Metrics are Computed from Alternative Samples
and Specifications for the China Entry Probit Model.
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
(1) 2009-2010
EXPOSURE×POST 0.07* 0.11* 0.20
(0.04) (0.06) (0.13)
[0.06] [0.05] [0.12]
(2) 2009-2010, includes non-fully controllable X
EXPOSURE×POST 0.07* 0.11** 0.37
(0.03) (0.05) (0.27)
[0.05] [0.04] [0.17]
(3) 2009-2012
EXPOSURE×POST 0.09** 0.13** 0.22**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.10)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.03]
(4) 2009-2012, includes non-fully controllable X
EXPOSURE×POST 0.09** 0.14*** 0.54**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.22)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
(5) 2013-2015
EXPOSURE×POST 0.06* 0.13*** 0.33***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.11)
[0.07] [0.01] [0.00]
(6) 2013-2015, includes non-fully controllable X
EXPOSURE×POST 0.05 0.13*** 0.31***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.11)
[0.16] [0.01] [0.00]
(7) 2009-2015
EXPOSURE×POST 0.08** 0.13** 0.27**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.11)
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
(8) 2009-2015, includes non-fully controllable X
EXPOSURE×POST 0.09** 0.13** 0.27**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.11)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
Observations 3,268 3,268 3,268
Panels are titled according to the sample and specification used to estimate the China entry probit.
(They follow the same order used in the Table of correlations of predicted China entry probabilities.)
“Non-fully controllable X” refers to MPAA rating indicators and award variables. Estimated models
include release-year fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and p-values in
brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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D.4 Bootstrapping
Figure A5: β Estimates from Bootstrapped Samples.
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The Bootstrapping procedure focuses on the estimation of the China entry probability model. We generate
1,000 pseudo samples by sampling 1,812 films released in 2009-2012 (with replacement) and generate the
set of exposure metrics from the resulting estimates. For each of these set of estimates, we then estimate
specification (1). Black dashed lines mark the median of each distribution; red lines, the respective point
estimates from our main results table.
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D.5 Details and Robustness for The Matched-Samples Procedure
We apply k-means clustering on the entire vector of observable film characteristics X.
Throughout our analysis, we only consider the main sample of non-animation films.
A crucial aspect to implement clustering is to determine the number of clusters. A
common way to approach this problem –the “Elbow” method– progressively increases the
number of clusters until the marginal reduction of total explained variance stabilizes. Our
approach adapts this principle to the overarching empirical design of our research.
In particular, because our inference crucially relies on a “pre/post” comparison, we
seek to balance this principle with the goal of producing as many clusters including both
“pre” and “post” films, as is possible.
Figure A6: Main elements for determination of the number of film clusters
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Figure A6 presents the main elements to consider in deciding the number of clusters.
The horizontal axis shows the number of clusters considered in each case. We vary these
in increments of 5. (Because X contains 25 variables, we consider a minimum of 25.)
The black line depicts the percentage of total variance (total sum of squares - Total SQ)
accounted for by between-cluster variation (between SQ). The larger this percentage, the
higher the share of total variance that is explained by the clustering. The solid blue line
shows the percentage of clusters within which there is at least one “pre” and at least one
“post” film. We refer to this statistic as the percentage of “matched” clusters. The dashed
blue line presents the percentage of all films in the sample included in these clusters.
Although the percentage of variance explained by the clustering increases concavely
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with the number of clusters, there is no noticeable stabilization of this trend in the con-
sidered range. Thus, we primarily base our decision on the number of matched clusters.
As shown by the generally declining blue lines, finer clustering translates into a marked
decrease in extent of matching. Up until 75 clusters, there is perfect matching. The
percentage of matched films (dashed blue line) remains generally high (≥ 99%) up to 190
clusters, after which it drops without recovering. With this configuration, 93% of clusters
(176) are matched and can be used in the main analysis.
Because it provides the finest categorization of films without implying a significant
loss of information, we use the 190-cluster clustering for our main analysis (presented in
text). Nevertheless, for robustness, we also consider three alternative, coarser clusterings.
These are shown by the dashed vertical lines in the graph. They are selected because
they represent a local peak in the number of matched clusters.
Before turning to our main robustness results, in Figure A7 we present the distribution
of clusters on the support of predicted probabilities of China entry (which map one-
to-one to EXPOSURE metrics). Graphs on the left are computed by predicting entry
probabilities after clustering (i.e., computed based on each cluster’s average X); those
on the right, by predicting these before clustering (predicted probabilities are computed
before clustering). Panels A-D reproduce these distributions under the diﬀerent numbers
of considered clusters. Overall, these distributions have similar shapes. More importantly,
they all resemble the distribution of films on the same support (see Figure 4 in article).
Table A4 reproduces the matched-sample regression presented in the main text, for
each case (i.e., number of clusters), when EXPOSURE metrics are based on China entry
probabilities predicted after clustering (i.e., using each cluster’s average X). Table A5
reproduces the same results, but with EXPOSURE metrics based on China entry prob-
abilities predicted before clustering. Results support the overall robustness of our main
estimate.
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Figure A7: Main elements for determination of the number of film clusters
(Left: probabilities predicted with average X within each cluster – Right: probabilities
predicted with each film’s X, then averaged within each cluster)
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Table A4: Robustness for the Matched-Samples procedure. (China entry probabilities
predicted after clustering.)
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
A. 75 Clusters
EXPOSURE 0.02 0.11** 0.11**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
[0.67] [0.04] [0.04]
Constant 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.14] [0.29] [0.21]
Observations 75 75 75
B. 105 Clusters
EXPOSURE 0.09** 0.12* 0.13*
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
[0.02] [0.06] [0.05]
Constant 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.59] [0.59] [0.48]
Observations 104 104 104
C. 165 Clusters
EXPOSURE 0.10*** 0.18*** 0.18**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
Constant 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.58] [0.79] [0.59]
Observations 156 156 156
D. 190 Clusters
EXPOSURE 0.11** 0.15** 0.19**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
[0.05] [0.02] [0.02]
Constant 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.59] [0.87] [0.72]
Observations 176 176 176
OLS results. Exposure metrics are computed from the estimates of Table 2, Column 1, given the average
values of the X vector within each cluster. Except for in panel A (where there is 100% “pre/post”
matching), the number of observations used in the regression is smaller than the number of clusters
because some observations are unmatched. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and
p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Robustness for the Matched-Samples procedure. (China entry probabilities
predicted before clustering.)
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
A. 75 Clusters
EXPOSURE 0.02 0.11** 0.10**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
[0.67] [0.04] [0.05]
Constant 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.14] [0.35] [0.26]
Observations 75 75 75
B. 105 Clusters
EXPOSURE 0.05 0.11* 0.13*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
[0.34] [0.08] [0.06]
Constant 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.42] [0.66] [0.55]
Observations 104 104 104
C. 165 Clusters
EXPOSURE 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.19**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
Constant 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.62] [0.97] [0.73]
Observations 156 156 156
B. 190 Clusters
EXPOSURE 0.11** 0.15** 0.19**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
[0.05] [0.02] [0.02]
Constant 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.59] [0.97] [0.81]
Observations 176 176 176
OLS results. Exposure metrics are computed from the estimates of Table 2, Column 1, for each film,
then averaged within each cluster. Except for in panel A (where there is 100% “pre/post” matching),
the number of observations used in the regression is smaller than the number of clusters because some
observations are unmatched. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and p-values in brackets.
Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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E. Endogenous Design Characteristics
E.1 Observable Characteristics
To further investigate the “redirection hypothesis” we aggregate the number of films
released each year, at diﬀerent shock exposure levels. We label the resulting variable
as NFILMS and perform the aggregation in two ways. First we aggregate within each
(DEXPOSURE,t) cell, and then within (q, t) cells, where q represents deciles of each of
the continuous exposure metrics among the distribution of films released prior to the new
policy’s announcement. The first aggregation procedure leaves us with 14 observations,
whereas the second, with 70. For each approach, respectively, we estimate the following
specifications:
E[NFILMS|DEXPOSURE, t] = f(α + βDEXPOSURE× POSTt
+γDEXPOSURE + λt)
E[NFILMS|q, t] = f(α + βEXPOSUREq × POSTt + δq + λt)
Where, as in our main specification, POST=1[t ≥ 2014] and λ are release-year fixed
eﬀects. f represents the functional form of the Poisson count-data model.1 In the second
specification, δ represents a fixed eﬀect for each exposure decile. In this specification,
we implement EXPOSUREq as the mean of EXPOSURE metrics within each decile.
Qualitative results don’t change if we instead use the maximum or minimum.
As before, the parameter of interest is β. A positive estimate thereof would suggest
that the 2012 policy change translated into a relative increase in the number of films with
characteristics X associated with more likely entry into the Chinese market. Because
identification arguments described in the main text apply directly to this specification,
they are omitted here. Similar specifications have been used by research exploring the
impacts of market expansion on technological innovation activity in the context of nat-
ural experiments (e.g., Blume-Kohout and Sood, 2013; Dranove et al., 2017; Hermosilla
and Wu, 2016). Estimation results are presented by Table A6. The lack of statistical
significance of β estimates invariably supports the graphical result, suggesting that the
2012 policy change did not fuel innovation of the types of films that cater to the Chinese
market.
1The data do not reject the Poisson assumptions. Results from analog Negative Binomial specifications
do not change the qualitative results.
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Table A6: Impacts on Innovative Activity.
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
EXPOSURE×POST -0.02 -0.05 -0.07
(0.05) (0.09) (0.25)
[0.75] [0.58] [0.78]
Observations 14 70 70
Procedures for data aggregation are described in text. Estimated models include release-year fixed eﬀects
as well fixed eﬀects for exposure categories. Exposure metrics are computed from the estimates of Table 2,
Column 1. POST is implemented as 1 = [t ≥ 2014]. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis
and p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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E.2 Unobservable Characteristics
Table A7 presents the validation results mentioned in text, for both metrics. Table A8
replicates our main results presented in text using the TF-IDF approach.
Table A7: Natural-Language Processing SIMILARITY and Diﬀerences in Observable
Characteristics.
(1) (2)
Bag-of-Words TF-IDF
A. Summary Plots
||XG|| -0.0074*** -0.0042***
(0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00]
||XC || -0.0002*** -0.0003***
(0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.0571*** 0.0292***
(0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00]
Observations 2,748,340 2,748,340
B. Synopsis
||XG|| -0.0031*** -0.0023***
(0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00]
||XC || -0.0013*** -0.0006***
(0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.0814*** 0.0226***
(0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00]
Observations 774,390 774,390
The dependent variable is SIMILARITY. ||XGij || and ||XCij || are Euclidean norms of vectors of genre
and sensitive content indicators, respectively. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and
p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A8: Storyline Similarity (TF-IDF SIMILARITY).
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
A. Summary Plots
EXPOSURE × CROSSPER -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.96] [0.66] [0.76]
Constant 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 23,177 23,177 23,177
B. Synopsis
EXPOSURE × CROSSPER -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
[0.69] [0.95] [0.97]
Constant 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 5,201 5,201 5,201
The dependent variable is SIMILARITY. EXPOSURE metrics are computed with the estimates of Table
2, Column 1. Estimated models include cluster-specific fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are presented
in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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F. Starmeter Data
Table A9: Films with larger budgets are more likely to include more famous actors.
Films’ budget Shares of actors with
percentiles top 10% popularity top 1% popularity
0-75 0.04 0.00
(0.21) (0.05)
76-90 0.20 0.02
(0.40) (0.14)
91-100 0.39 0.07
(0.49) (0.27)
Budget levels are computed according to the P75BUDGET and P90BUDGET variables introduced in
Section 3. Actors’ popularity is measured using IMDB’s “Starmeter” variable.
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G. Composition
We first provide a falsification test for the Probit results of Table 11 (Panel) A. These
suggest that the participation of light-skin actresses increased as a consequence of the
policy change. Because once we focus on female roles we are left with few observations
from voice roles and animation films, we focus on the test that falsifies the date of the
policy change. As in our main analysis, we drop films released after 2012, and assume a
that the policy change impacted films released in 2011 and 2012. That is, in this case we
implement POST=1[t ≥ 2011]. Results are presented in Table A10. These support the
causal interpretation of the estimates presented in the text.
Table A10: Female/Male Starring Participation.
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
EXPOSURE×POST 0.24 0.48 1.64
(0.22) (0.37) (1.27)
[0.27] [0.20] [0.19]
Observations 1,867 1,867 1,867
Probit results. The dependent variable is y1r = 1[Individual playing female role r belongs to skin color
category k = 1]. Exposure metrics are computed from the estimates of Table 2, Column 1. POST is
implemented as 1 = [t ≥ 2011]. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and p-values in
brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
We now turn to providing evidence suggesting that the 2012 Chinese policy change
did not alter the female/male composition among starring roles. To this end, we compute
the following variable:
SHAREFEMALEROLESi =
Number of female actors in non-voice roles in film i
Total (female+male) actors in non-voice roles in film i
We use this as a dependent variable in a regression using the specification of equation
(1). Results are presented in Table A11. These suggest that the policy change did not
impact the male/female composition among starring roles.
Table A11: Female/Male Starring Participation.
(1) (2) (3)
DEXPOSURE CEXPOSURE1 CEXPOSURE2
EXPOSURE×POST -0.01 -0.00 0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.09)
[0.70] [1.00] [0.67]
Observations 3,268 3,268 3,268
The dependent variable is SHAREFEMALEROLES. Exposure metrics are computed from the estimates
of Table 2, Column 1. POST is implemented as 1 = [t ≥ 2014]. Robust standard errors are presented in
parenthesis and p-values in brackets. Legend: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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